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ASSESSING THE COSTS & BENEFITS OF
CREDIT CARD REWARDS: A RESPONSE
TO WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES
FROM CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS?
THEORY AND CALIBRATIONS
Steven Semeraro*

F

or two decades, economic and legal academics have
speculated about the impact of the fees that merchants
pay for credit card acceptance. Since all customers pay the same
price, the theory goes, everyone pays for the benefits that go only
to credit card users. A recent Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(FRBB) policy paper written by economists Scott Schuh, Oz Shy,
and Joanna Stavins entitled Who Gains and Who Loses from
Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations 1 has taken the
argument a step further, contending that credit card programs
reduce consumer welfare by transferring money from low-income
households that purchase goods and services with payment
* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author thanks
the American Bankers Association for its generous support for this paper, and
economists Scott Thompson and Eric Emch of the Bates, White economic
consulting firm for their valuable assistance. During the late 1990s, the author
was the lead attorney on an investigation of Visa and MasterCard when he
served as a trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division. The views expressed herein are exclusively those of the
author.
1
Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from
Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations (Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Public Policy Discussion Papers No. 10-03, 2010) [hereinafter FRBB].
A revised version of the paper by the same authors expands their wealth
transfer analysis beyond card rewards. Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins,
Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and
Calibrations, at 26 (May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Schuh et al. 2011]. This version,
which has apparently not been published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, is cited throughout to highlight relevant differences with Paper No.
10-03.
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mechanisms other than credit cards to high-income households
that pay with cards. Although recognizing that their analysis does
not yield “precise policy recommendations that would necessarily
optimize social welfare,” 2 the authors nonetheless offer
suggestions for improvement. 3 Specifically, they suggest that
regulators “could” increase consumer welfare by (1) eliminating
card system rules that prohibit merchants from surcharging
credit card transactions, and (2) directly regulating merchant fees
and reward rates. 4 Both proposals would likely reduce or
eliminate reward programs.
This article shows that the FRBB economists’ policy
recommendations would be more likely to harm consumers than
to help them. First, the authors’ welfare claims are narrower than
a casual reader might assume. They do not argue that any reward
program constitutes a bad deal for a cardholder who takes
advantage of the program. On the contrary, they show that,
regardless of a cardholder’s income level, reward cards benefit
those who use them and collect rewards.5 Like all credit cards,
they provide spending flexibility, a no-cost float period for those
who do not run balances, and accounting benefits. In addition,
reward cards effectively lower the price that card users pay for all
goods and services purchased with the card through a bonus that
suits the cardholder’s own market preferences. Any regulatory
steps that reduce the value of reward card programs would
unquestionably reduce the welfare of those consumers regularly
receiving card rewards.
The FRBB authors do claim that reward programs harm
those consumers who do not use credit cards because merchants
increase prices to cover card acceptance costs. The FRBB
authors’ data demonstrates that high-income households use
reward credit cards more often than low-income households. 6
This disproportionate use, the authors’ claim, transfers wealth
from poorer to wealthier consumers. Importantly, however, the
welfare transfer that they predict occurs, if at all, only because
low-income households on average choose to use reward credit
cards for a lower percentage of their purchases than do higherincome households.

2
3
4
5
6

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
FRBB, supra note 1, at 7.
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The FRBB authors’ proposals would certainly reduce the
value of reward card programs and thus the welfare of all reward
card users. Any consumer welfare gains from implementing those
proposals, however, would be quite speculative. To support their
welfare predictions, the FRBB authors claim that one can draw
meaningful conclusions about consumer welfare effects by
assuming that: (1) merchants pass on the marginal cost of card
acceptance through their retail prices to all consumers on a
dollar-for-dollar basis 7; and (2) the only relevant benefit in
assessing the consumer welfare impact of payment system choice
is the reward paid to credit card users. 8
The data on which the FRBB authors rely do not confirm
these assumptions. On the contrary, those assumptions are almost
certainly wrong. Credit card acceptance benefits merchants,
banks, and even consumers using other payment mechanisms in
ways that impact the net prices paid by all customers. Merchants
would not mark up their retail prices by the full marginal cost of
credit card acceptance costs over other means of payment if, for
example, card acceptance (1) increases sales by enabling
consumers to shop more efficiently – alleviating the need to
predetermine the amount of cash needed or knowing ones
checking account balance – enabling a merchant to spread its
fixed costs over more sales or (2) reduces other costs such as the
risk of unpaid checks, late payment, default, and collection
expenses. 9 In addition, banks may use reward card system profits
to innovate and expand products that benefit all consumers, such
as more effective fraud protection, enhanced security, and
systems that speed up transactions at the point of sale. 10
Moreover, although consumers who choose not to use
rewards credit cards by definition do not receive credit card
rewards, they may still benefit from their payment choice in other
ways. First, reward card use creates spillover effects – such as
faster checkout times – benefiting all customers. Second,
overwhelmingly consumers choose to use non-credit-card
payment mechanisms for some purchases and reward credit cards
7
More specifically, the authors assume that credit card use increases
retail prices by precisely the amount that credit card use exceeds the cost to the
merchant of alternative means of payment. See infra Part IV.A. The authors’
analysis ignores the extent to which merchant’s benefit from card acceptance
in ways that may lower prices. See infra Part IV.B.
8
See infra Part IV.A.
9
See infra Part IV.B.
10
Id.
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for others, necessarily benefitting themselves in ways not fully
accounted for in the FRBB policy paper.11 As a result, the FRBB
authors’ welfare calculations are at best overstated and
potentially entirely inaccurate.
Even if one irrationally ignored the non-reward benefits of
payment system choices, the FRBB authors’ welfare calculations
would remain suspect. Important aspects of their consumer
welfare calculation – most importantly, the strength of the
preference consumers have for reward cards or other means of
payment and the negative consumer welfare effect of transferring
money from low- to high-income households – rest on
assumptions that are entirely independent of the data on which
the authors purport to rely. 12 These assumptions are critical to the
magnitude of the consumer welfare effect that they predict, and
the uncertainty with respect to these factors undermines the
reliability of their analysis.
Regulatory intervention is also suspect because if the
FRBB authors predicted wealth transfers from credit card
programs existed, they would be indistinguishable from a myriad
of other reward programs and retailing strategies that have the
same impact. 13 That these practices are so widespread indicates
that they are generally accepted as legitimate competitive options
supporting economic vitality.
Finally, the FRBB authors’ specific policy proposals –
encouraging surcharging and regulating fees – could have serious,
negative unintended consequences. 14 The ubiquitous nature of
rewards programs and other retailing strategies that benefit those
who spend heavily suggests that these programs have economic
benefits. Rather than undermining card rewards, any regulatory
activity in credit card markets should focus on expanding the
availability of consumer-welfare enhancing reward programs to
those consumers who currently choose not to use them. 15 The
FRBB authors’ proposals, designed to reduce reward card
availability, thus point in precisely the wrong direction.
This article begins by explaining the role of merchant fees
11
See infra at 64-65 (reference to charts showing that two thirds of
households have both credit and debit cards; nearly all have checking accounts
in addition to cards; and they use these payment mechanisms in different
percentages for different categories of purchases).
12
See infra Part V.
13
See infra Part VI.
14
See infra Part VII.
15
See infra Part VIII.
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in credit card systems. Part II summarizes the history of the
literature recognizing that credit card programs may theoretically
transfer wealth from low-income to high-income households.
This part also examines the FRBB policy paper in this context.
Part III demonstrates that the FRBB economists’ conclusions are
suspect because the assumptions underlying their analysis
underestimate the benefits of current payment system choices
accruing to merchants, card issuing banks, and non-credit card
users. In Part IV, this paper shows that even if an individual
irrationally ignored non-reward benefits, the author’s consumer
welfare predictions would depend on assumptions that are
independent of the hard data and are thus essentially arbitrary.
Part V shows that similar wealth transfer effects are pervasive
throughout the economy. Part VI explains why permitting
merchants to surcharge card transactions or regulating merchant
fees would be unwise responses to any wealth transfer that may
exist. And finally, this article offers alternative steps that could
combat the potentially negative effects of transferring wealth
without the risks associated with permitting card transaction
surcharges or regulating acceptance fees.

I. PRICING IN CREDIT CARD MARKETS
This section explains how the stream of payments flows in
a credit card transaction and how banks participating in the card
system earn revenue. The process begins with a cardholder
purchasing a good or service using the card, thus generating a
receipt for payment. The card-purchase receipt flows from the
merchant to its card acceptance bank (CAB) and then to the
bank, such as Citibank, that issued the Visa, MasterCard,
American Express, or Discover card (issuer). For example, when
a customer makes a $100 purchase with a credit card, the
merchant’s CAB would pay the retailer approximately $98. The
difference is the merchant’s fee ($2 in this case) for card
acceptance. This fee is commonly called the merchant discount
because it amounts to a discount from the full purchase price that
compensates the credit card system. 16
Next, the issuer would typically pay the CAB

16
In many cases, the merchant fee would include a small fixed amount
per transaction as well as a percentage of the total. The fixed fee is ignored in
the illustration in the text to demonstrate more clearly the flow of funds.
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approximately $98.50 for the receivable 17 and bill the cardholder
for the entire $100, plus interest if the account has a balance.
From the $2.00 fee paid by the merchant, the CAB would
typically keep about $.50 or 25%. The remaining $1.50,
approximately 75% of the revenue from the merchant, constitutes
the fee that a merchant effectively pays to the issuer. 18 This fee is
often referred to as the interchange fee. 19 Both the level of the
merchant discount and the percentages of the purchase price
retained by the issuer and the CAB will vary depending on the
industry, type of card, and a variety of other factors. In all cases,
however, the issuer will receive a substantially larger percentage
of the merchant fee than the CAB. 20
Although merchant fees are an important source of cardissuer revenue, approximately 70% of a typical card issuer’s
revenue comes from interest paid by cardholders for financed
purchases. 21 In addition, a recent survey by Phoenix Marketing
International shows that some credit cards, and particularly
reward cards, also carry an annual fee paid by the cardholder. 22
Issuers also charge cardholders a variety of other fees for services
provided as well as for violations of the cardholder agreement,
such as late payments, that raise the cost of the system for all
participants.

In practice, a small percentage of the merchant fee compensates the
card network rather than either the CAB or the issuer for the network’s costs
of processing transactions.
18
Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and
Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 313, 340 (1998).
19
The term interchange was used in the Visa and MasterCard systems
because it constituted the fee that a bank acquiring card transactions from a
merchant paid to the bank that had issued the card. Unitary systems such as
American Express, Diners Club, and Discover did not technically have
interchange fees. Nevertheless, they have always charged more to merchants
than the cost of providing merchant services. As a result, merchant fees were
used by these systems to support the card issuing business, just as they were in
the Visa and MasterCard systems. Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange
Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941,
947 (2007).
20
Id.
21
DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC:
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 223 (2d ed. 2005).
22
Appendix I.F. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review.
17
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II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE FRBB AUTHORS’
CONSUMER WELFARE ANALYSIS
The FRBB authors do not contend that (1) card use
reduces the welfare of any consumer who receives card rewards;
or (2) the banks’ business model sacrifices profit from highincome card users in order to increase revenues earned from lowincome households.
A. Reward Card Holders Benefit From the Current Credit Card
System
The FRBB authors’ data shows that reward credit cards
are generally available to consumers in both low- and highincome groups, those who use reward credit cards to collect air
travel, discounts, or cash, experience substantial welfare gains. 23
The FRBB policy paper thus confirms that reward cards are a
good deal for those who use them to collect rewards, regardless of
the cardholder’s income level. 24 As the authors conclude, even
“low-income credit card buyers” benefit from those cards,
receiving “a subsidy ($613)” annually as a result of their reward
card use. 25
B. High-Income Card Users Generate Substantial Bank Profits
The FRBB policy paper focuses entirely on the fees that
merchants pay for card acceptance. The authors’ primary model
takes no account of the impact of revolving credit, annual fees, or
other fee revenue earned by banks issuing credit cards. 26 Yet, this
FRBB, supra note 1, at 38 (Table 11) (showing that reducing card
rewards alone would reduce consumer welfare).
24
Id. at 20-21 (Table 6).
25
Id. at 21.
26
In a draft revision of their paper, the authors purport to take account of
revolving debt. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 3, at 9-10, 15-16, 19-24. Although
they recognize that high-income households revolve more often and pay more
interest (albeit at a slightly lower interest rate), the authors conclude that on
average taking account of revolving debt increases the transfer somewhat. Id.
at 9. Their revised analysis, however, is driven by the their assumptions about
the distribution of profits through stock ownership. Id. at 27 (calculating that
nearly two-thirds of the transfer between low- and high-income households
persists even when the two groups are assumed to shop at entirely different
merchants because of the authors assumptions about “interest payments, float,
and redistributed profits”). Id. Transfer effects resulting from interest
23
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revenue exceeds merchant fee revenue collected by card-issuing
banks, and low-income households do not pay more than their
proportional share of it. Over the past decade, Phoenix Marketing
International surveyed over 21,000 households about their
payment system choices. 27 The data generated by this survey
confirmed that reward card accounts contribute more to total
market performance than non-rewards accounts, particularly at
high-income levels from all three sources (financing, cardholder
fees, and merchant fees). 28 A rarely used account, by contrast, is
unprofitable. High-use cardholders, a disproportionate
percentage of which are high-income cardholders, thus subsidize
low-income cardholders who use their credit cards only rarely. 29
The FRBB authors do not dispute this conclusion, recognizing
that (1) “the propensity to revolve credit card spending is
surprisingly similar across income groups”; 30 (2) “high-income
households carry about twice as much revolving debt as lowincome households”; and (3) high-income households pay on
average almost twice as much interest. 31 High-income households
also generate more annual fee revenue than low-income
households. 32 The FRBB authors do not dispute this, recognizing
that all cardholder income groups pay more than enough out of
their own pockets “to cover the credit card rewards earned by the
group.” 33
payments occur because they are assumed to fund the float period enjoyed by
convenience users, a transfer that impacts high-income households as often as
low-income households, (See Table 3), and is purely a matter of household
choice. Id. at 9, 22-23. The assumptions about redistribution of bank profits
are criticized. See infra at IV.C.
27
Appendix at I.A. (providing background on data produced by the
Phoenix Marketing International survey of consumers about their payment
system choices). This survey data is cited throughout this article and is on file
with the Consumer Law Review.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
FRBB, supra note 1, at 4. Reward credit cards often have a slightly
higher interchange fee than non-reward cards, but this increment amounts to
only about 25% of a typical reward payment and accounts for an even lower
percentage of the more generous reward programs.
31
Id. at 42 (low income households average $788 in interest per year while
high income households average $1,316).
32
Id. at 43 (low-income households pay an average of $5.7 while highincome households pay $7.7). The FRBB authors nevertheless conclude that
interest income is unlikely to play “a major role in the [wealth] transfers.” Id.
at 4, 42.
33
Id. at 42.

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

38

Loyola Consumer Law Review

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Vol. 25:1

This data and analysis shows that the FRBB authors’
predicted wealth transfer from low- to high-income households
cannot be attributed to any inherent flaw in the card systems.
They do not point to any data suggesting that reward cards are
unavailable to low-income households, and the authors make
clear that they have no reason to believe that banks have
designed card systems to transfer wealth. 34 The most recent
Phoenix Marketing data confirms the wide availability of reward
cards, showing that they outpace non-reward card ownership
across income groups.
As a result, if high-income households receive
disproportionate benefits, they do so in part because individual
members of those households choose to use credit cards to make a
higher percentage of their purchases than members of low-income
households. Any wealth transfer that may occur is thus
attributable to individual consumer choices about payment
mechanisms.

III. THE HISTORY OF CREDIT CARD WEALTH
TRANSFER ANALYSIS
The basic economic intuition underlying the FRBB
authors’ wealth transfer calculations is not new. Since the early1980s, commentators have explained that credit card use might
transfer wealth from non-card customers to card users because
merchants pay for card transactions by blending their card
acceptance fees with their other costs of doing business.35 All
customers thus pay the same retail price at the point of sale
regardless of the means of payment used. So, if (a) a purchase
made with a credit card costs merchants more than a purchase
made with another means of payment and (b) merchants increase
their retail prices on a dollar-for-dollar basis to recover the entire
difference in cost between card acceptance and other means of
payment, then (c) non-credit card customers would subsidize card
users.
To the extent that high-income households use cards more
frequently than low-income households, this transfer could cross
income groups. Importantly, no commentator prior to the FRBB
authors has claimed that the theoretical possibility of a wealth
34
Id. at 4-5; see infra note 126 (citing sources confirming the wide
availability of reward credit cards).
35
See infra Part III.A.

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

2012

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Assessing Credit Card Rewards

39

transfer can be confirmed and be used to calculate the overall
effect of credit card use on consumer welfare.
This section reviews the existing commentary, placing the
FRBB policy paper in the context of a long-history of theorizing
about the potential wealth transfer effects of credit card use. It
first focuses on commentary recognizing the theoretical possibility
of a transfer, and it then summarizes the claims made by the
FRBB authors and the author of another recent paper claiming
to demonstrate empirically that a transfer in fact occurs.
A. The Theory that Credit Card Use Transfers Wealth
In 1983, a Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ staff
report explained that a statute permitting cash discounts was at
least in part justified by a potential wealth transfer from noncredit-card to credit card users. The report noted that “[t]he
fundamental thesis underlying the Cash Discount Act is that
credit card transactions are more costly to retailers than cash or
check transactions, and that the higher costs of credit cards are
incorporated in the price of goods and services paid by all
customers, resulting in a subsidy of credit buyers by cash
purchasers.” 36
A dozen years later, economists Dennis Carlton and Alan
Frankel expanded on this possibility. Interchange fees, they
explained, “can be viewed as a way to raise costs to merchants
who then pass those costs on to cash and credit customers alike
by charging the same higher price to both.” 37 Like the Federal
Reserve authors’ staff, these economists recognized that
merchants generally charge the same price to all customers
regardless of the means of payment, 38 and both cash and credit
consumers therefore contribute to the merchant’s costs of
John M. Barron, Michael E. Staten & John Umbeck, Discounts for
Cash in Retail Gasoline Marketing 16 (Credit Research Center, Krannert
Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, Working Paper 57,
Sept.1991) (quoting Credit Cards in the U.S. Economy: Their Impact on Costs,
Prices, and Retail Sales, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve
System,
1996)
available
at
http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/wp57.pdf.
37
Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of
Credit Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 643, 656-58 (1994-95).
38
Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 627, 632 (2006) (“Price coherence creates
cross-subsidies between payment methods with different costs.”); Frankel,
supra note 18, at 314-39.
36
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accepting various means of payment. 39
In 2001, economist Michael Katz concluded that, all else
being equal, “[w]hen card-based transactions are more costly to
merchants than are non-card-based transactions, non-card users
are hurt by card use because merchants have incentives to raise
retail prices to reflect their higher costs due to some consumers’
using relatively expensive payment means.” 40 Katz identified the
potential problem as an economic distortion, rather than a wealth
transfer. The potentially higher prices that might occur as a result
of increased card use, Katz argued, would inefficiently distort
consumption by increasing the relative attractiveness of goods
sold in markets with little or no card use. 41
In 2002-03, two economic papers presented formal models
recognizing that credit card use could potentially produce cross
subsidies between types of consumers. Marius Schwartz and
Daniel Vincent examined the interacting effects of the card
systems’ no-surcharge rules and reward programs. 42 They found
that cash customers are harmed because they fund resources that
are used to compensate card users, although they concluded that
the net social welfare effect of surcharging is ambiguous.43
Shortly thereafter, Sujit Chakravorti and William Emmons
concluded that surcharging could reduce the negative effects of a
cross-subsidy from those who borrow on credit cards to those
Michael L. Katz, Commissioned Report, 2 REFORM OF CREDIT CARD
SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA 41 (Reserve Bank of Australia Aug. 2001) available at
http://www.rba.gov.au/PaymentsSystem/Reforms/CCSchemes/consult_doc_ot
her_pub.html (“When card-based transactions are more costly to merchants
than are non-card-based transactions, non-card users are hurt by card use
because merchants have incentives to raise retail prices to reflect their higher
costs due to some consumers’ using relatively expensive payment means.”);
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Externalities and Regulation in Card
Payment Systems, 5 REV. NETWORK CON. 1, 4 (2006) (“Merchants are likely to
pass the extra costs, if any, of card transactions through to consumers in
general, that is to cardholders and cash payers altogether”). This subsidization
of card use by merchants may be efficient just as the subsidization of
newspaper production and delivery costs by newspaper advertisers is efficient.
For a discussion of the economics, see Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust
Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card Transactions, 14 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 343, 353-65 (2009).
40
Katz, supra note 39, at 41.
41
Id. at 39.
42
Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent, Same Price, Cash or Card:
Vertical Control by Payment Networks 6, 23 (Dep’t. of Econ., Georgetown U.,
Working Paper 02-01, 2002).
43
Id.
39
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who use the cards merely to transact and collect rewards. 44
In 2005, Carlton and Frankel published another paper,
this time suggesting that a potential wealth transfer could flow
not just from card users to non-card users, but from low- to highincome households.45 “[L]ow income and minority households,”
they observed, “are far more likely to use cash exclusively than
are more affluent households.” 46
In 2006, Alan Frankel, this time with economist Allan
Shampine, argued that card acceptance fees “significantly and
arbitrarily raise[] prices,” and distort competition by “steering
consumers toward using more costly and less efficient payment
methods.” 47
Their analysis shows a connection between
increasing interchange fees and increasing card purchase volume,
because card issuers use the revenue from interchange fees to
lower prices for card users and to increase rewards. 48 “Although it
is true that an interchange fee will stimulate card usage,” they
claimed, “it accomplishes this not merely by shifting costs of card
usage to merchants, but to non-card customers.” 49
None of this commentary took account of the benefits that
increasing card use provides to merchants. Instead, the authors
reasoned that all else being equal, as card acceptance fees
increase, merchants will tend to raise prices as they would if any
other cost of doing business increased. 50 Most of the authors
simply ignored the possibility that all would not be equal if credit
card use benefitted merchants, banks, and non-card-using
customers. 51 Taking these benefits into account could yield net
Sujit Chakravorti & William R. Emmons, Who Pays for Credit Cards?,
37 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 208, 226-27 (2003).
45
Dennis Carleton & Alan Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and
“Two-Sided” Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 637, 640-41
(“only 28.5% of families with annual income below $10,000 possess a bank
credit card, compared to 95.8% of families with incomes above $100,000, and
only ‘59% of African-American households had credit cards in 2001, compared
to 53% for Latinos and 82% for whites’”) (quoting Study Shows Card Use
Linked to Race, CARDLINE, http://www.cardline.com (May 24, 2005) (citing a
study based on data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances
for the years 1992 through 2001).
46
Id.
47
Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 671-72.
48
Id. at 634-37 (“cardholders pay higher retail prices as interchange fees
increase”).
49
Id. at 658-59.
50
Id. at 636; Chakravorti & Emmons, supra note 44, at 210; Schwartz &
Vincent, supra note 42, at 16.
51
Schwartz and Vincent are the exception, recognizing explicitly that they
44
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consumer welfare increases, even for non-card-using consumers,
compared to a world without credit cards.
B. Claiming to Empirically Confirm a Consumer -Welfare
Decreasing Transfer
Prior to the FRBB policy paper, no commentator claimed
to quantify the magnitude of a consumer welfare decrease as a
result of the theoretical possibility of a wealth transfer from lowincome to high-income households. One non-economist author,
Adam Levitin, did claim to empirically confirm a wealth transfer
from non-card users to credit card purchasers. 52 This section
identifies the weaknesses in Levitin’s more limited wealth
transfer claim, and it then reviews the FRBB authors’ uniquely
expansive social welfare claims.
1. Credit Card Fees and Gasoline Retailer Cash Discounts
Levitin based his analysis on data showing that when, in
the late 1980s, gasoline retailers regularly charged separate cash
and credit prices, they always charged card users more than cash
customers. From this, he concluded that card acceptance
increased costs for all customers and thus shifted wealth toward
credit card users.53 Importantly, Levitin’s claim is distinguishable
from those made in the FRBB policy paper, because Levitin did
not draw explicit conclusions about changes in overall consumer
welfare as a result of the wealth transfer that he purported to
confirm.
In addition, Levitin’s analysis was criticized because he
ignored the likelihood that the market forces driving the gas
stations’ differing prices for cash and credit transactions were
attributable to factors having little to do with credit card
acceptance fees. 54 Since the late 1980s, both credit markets and
“restrict[ed their] attention to . . . where the merchant derives no gross benefit
from processing card rather than cash transactions . . .” Schwartz & Vincent,
supra note 42, at 16.
52
Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant
Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008).
53
Although Levitin’s empirical analysis did not directly address a wealth
transfer between income groups, he nonetheless urged Congress to take steps
similar to those proposed by the FRBB authors, including rules prohibiting
merchants from surcharging card transactions. Id. at 15-16.
54
Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis:
Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L.
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the benefits of card acceptance have changed dramatically. Most
critically, gasoline retailers now overwhelmingly charge the same
price for cash and credit purchases, and some effectively discount
credit purchases through the use of reward cards. 55 As a result,
the price differences observed in Levitin’s data are not
generalizable across time and industries, and thus cannot
conclusively demonstrate a transfer from non-card users to card
purchasers, much less from low-income to high-income
households. 56
2. The FRBB Policy Paper’s Unique Consumer Welfare Claims
The FRBB policy paper’s authors acknowledge that the
theory that credit card use may transfer wealth is not new. But
they claim to be “the first to compute who gains and loses from
credit card payments in the aggregate economy” on a dollar-fordollar basis.57 In summarizing their findings, the FRBB authors
claim that a consumer’s “decision to pay by credit card
involves . . . retail price increases, a nontrivial transfer of income
from cash to card payers, and consequently a transfer from lowincome to high-income consumers.” 58
This process occurs, the FRBB authors contend, because
“merchants mark up their retail prices for all consumers by
enough to recoup the merchant fees from credit card sales” 59 and
“merchant fees are passed on [] to all buyers in the form of higher
retail prices.” 60 Card rewards come into play because card issuers
are assumed to use merchant fees in part to pay rewards to card
users. Non-card users thus pay higher prices that help fund the
J. REV. 419, 437-43 (2009).
55
Appendix II.K. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. See Shell Platinum
Mastercard,
SHELL,
http://www.shell.us/home/content/usa/products_services/shell_cards/mastercar
d/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (describing Exxon the Shell MasterCard paying a
15 cent with which cardholders can save $.10-.20 per gallon rebate plus 2% of
other purchases up compared to $10,000 and 1% on additional eligible
purchases paying with cash).
56
Semeraro, supra note 54, at 437-43.
57
Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 2.
58
Id. at 1.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 2.
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rewards, but they receive no rewards themselves. Reward card
use thus transfers wealth, the authors reason, to those who use
those cards. 61
Next, the FRBB authors observe that card use is not
consistent across income types. Higher income groups use credit
cards more and receive greater rewards than low-income groups.
“Consequently,” the authors reason, “the subsidy of credit card
payers by cash payers also involves a regressive transfer of
income from low-income to high-income consumers.” 62 The
authors calculate that on average each household with an annual
income below $50,000 contributes from $21-$26 to subsidize
wealthier households. The loss becomes a small gain for
households with incomes exceeding $50,000 annually and grows
to the point that the average household earning above $150,000
per year receives a $750 annual subsidy. 63 The authors then
calculate that eliminating merchant fees and card rewards would
increase consumer welfare by 0.15-0.26 percent; a result that they
believe justifies regulatory intervention. 64
The authors acknowledge that households, merchants,
and banks all could take steps to preempt these predicted welfare
transfers and that “the limitations of [their] model and analysis
[does not permit them to] provide precise policy recommendations
that would necessarily optimize social welfare.” 65 Nevertheless,
See generally id. at 28 (showing assumed values for the cost of
accepting cash, credit cards, and of reward payments to card users).
62
Id. at 2.
63
Id. at 22. In a draft revision of the paper, the authors purport to
consider the financing component of credit cards in addition to merchant fees
and rewards. In this version, the positive impact of cards does not kick in until
household income exceeds $120,000 annually and the authors calculate that
households making under $100,000 on average contribute $81 and households
making over $100,000 gain $350. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 26; id. at 3
(breaking the calculation out as, on average, a $63 loss for households earning
less than $20,000 per year and a $840 gain for households earning more than
$150,000 annually).
64
Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 3-4, 21. The authors consider
alterations to their model (e.g., price differentiation and imperfect competition)
that would reduce, but not eliminate, the transfer payment that they calculate.
Id. at 38-40. They then conjecture that business card use, which they do not
consider, would increase the transfer because business cards are more likely to
be used by high-income households. Id. at 43. But business cards are also
likely to be used overwhelmingly to make purchases that low-income
cardholders are relatively less likely to make: air travel, taxis, expensive hotels,
and fine dining establishments.
65
Id. at 35.
61
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they recommend, inter alia, that regulatory authorities consider
the following initiatives: eliminate impediments to merchants
surcharging card transactions; and directly regulate merchant
fees with the caveat that the optimal fee is difficult to determine
and thus regulators “could actually reduce consumer welfare.” 66
The following section demonstrates that the FRBB
authors’ wealth transfer calculations are suspect because of their
failure to consider fully the benefits of various payment system
choices to merchants, banks, and non-credit-card users. These
benefits impact the magnitude of any wealth transfer and
potentially its direction as well. Subsequent parts show that even
if non-reward benefits are ignored, (1) the authors’ welfare
calculations rest on essentially arbitrary assumptions that are not
dictated by their data, and (2) any wealth transfer that may occur
would not justify the sort of regulatory responses that the FRBB
authors propose.

IV. TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF
PAYMENT SYSTEM CHOICES
The FRBB policy paper claims to calculate the amount by
which credit card use reduces consumer welfare. In making their
predictions, the authors purport to rely on a comprehensive data
set. 67
But these hard data do not dictate their welfare
calculations. To generate those results, the authors implausibly
assume that the only benefits from payment system choice that
matter to consumer welfare are the rewards paid to credit card
users. This Part explains the authors’ assumption and then
discusses how the array of benefits flowing from card use to
merchants, banks, and even non-credit-card using consumers
impacts consumer welfare.
A. The FRBB Authors’ Implicitly Assume that Credit Card
Rewards are the Only Benefit of Payment System Choice
The authors’ consumer welfare prediction flows from the
following line of reasoning: a merchant’s net – as opposed to outof-pocket – cost of accepting credit cards is equal to the difference
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 5 (finding that over the past 20 years, the percentage of total
consumption paid for by credit cards has increased by two thirds); id. at 7-9, 16
(wealthy consumers on average use credit cards more than low-income
households but wide variance exists within all wealth levels).
66
67
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between the price that a bank charges the merchant for card
acceptance services and the merchant’s blended out-of-pocket
costs for handling alternative means of payment (i.e., the
merchant receives no cost reducing benefits from card
acceptance); a merchant passes “through the full merchant [credit
card acceptance] fee to . . . customers via the retail price,” 68
making the merchant’s single price to all customers higher than it
otherwise would be in the absence of credit card use by precisely
the amount that the merchant’s card acceptance fees exceed what
the merchant would have paid if its customers had used
alternative means of payment; 69 card fees are in fact higher than
the cost of other means of payment and thus card use increases
retail prices and reduces the welfare of all consumers; and credit
card rewards increase the welfare of card-using consumers more
than the higher retail prices reduced their welfare, but non-card
using consumers are worse off because they receive no rewards
and, implicitly, no other benefit flowing from payment system
choice is relevant to consumer welfare.
To be sure, the FRBB policy paper acknowledges that the
“validity [of its assumptions] is an empirical matter and the data
needed to verify them are not available.” 70 But the problem goes
well beyond a lack of precision in the available information to the
basic question of how to assess consumer welfare. The authors
tacitly and inexplicably deem benefits flowing from card use
(other than rewards) irrelevant. They never acknowledge this
assumption. Like most of the theoretical papers summarized in
Part III, they fail to incorporate into their calculations other
benefits from payment system choices that flow to merchants,
banks, and non-credit-card-using consumers. Unlike the
theoretical papers, however, the FRBB authors claim to draw
firm, real world conclusions from their analysis.
The following sections show that (1) the non-reward
benefits of card use and (2) the benefits that consumers receive
from choosing different payment mechanisms for different
purposes could both significantly impact the magnitude and even
the direction of any wealth transfer and thus the consumer
welfare implications of card rewards.

68
69
70

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16.
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B. The Benefits of Credit Card Use to Merchants
The FRBB authors’ analysis considers the merchants’
out-of-pocket cost of accepting credit cards, but it fails to consider
the benefits accruing to the merchant as a result of card
acceptance or the costs that would likely accrue if credit cards
were not available. If the authors believe that merchants receive
no direct benefits or cost savings, they fail to explain that wholly
unjustified conclusion. Merchants are not required to accept
credit cards. Some do not, and many do not accept all brands of
cards. Merchants must therefore perceive some benefit to
accepting the cards that they choose to accept.
To determine the impact of card acceptance on retail
prices and consumer welfare, a merchant’s benefits, including
ancillary cost savings resulting from card acceptance, must be
weighed against its costs to determine the merchant’s net loss or
gain. The FRBB authors effectively assume that, without credit
cards, the merchant would have exactly the same costs (except for
the absence of credit card acceptance fees) and make just as many
sales in precisely the same quantities and with the same
likelihood of actually receiving timely payment. The authors’
analysis thus amounts to a worst-case scenario that would apply
only if – for some mysterious reason – merchants accepted credit
cards even though they received no benefit from doing so.
No hard data supports this unrealistic assumption, and
strong intuitions as well as available data weigh against it. As an
initial matter, credit cards provide the merchant with a
guaranteed source of timely payment. Particularly for larger
purchases, the likely alternative – a check – carries considerable
risk.71 According to the 2010 Federal Reserve Payments Study,
126.8 million checks totaling $126.9 billion were returned
unpaid. 72 Although not all bad checks were written to merchants
that could have alternatively accepted credit card payments, a

Although the percentage of non-cash payments made by check has
fallen in recent years, they are still used for approximately twenty percent of
all payments and probably a much higher percentage of large payments in
excess of a few hundred dollars. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE 2010
FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2006 – 2009 11 (Apr. 5, 2011) (showing that in 2009 out of
$109 billion non-cash payments 24.5 billion were paid by check compared to
21.6 billion by credit card); id. at 13 (showing average check to be $1165); id. at
54 (showing average value of a credit card transaction to be $86).
72
Id. at 23.
71
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substantial portion surely were. Over 70% of check payments by
number and over 80% by value were made by consumers or
businesses to businesses and thus potentially could have
substituted for a credit card transaction. 73 And subscribing to
systems to protect against bad checks would (1) increase the
merchant’s out of pocket costs just as credit card acceptance
does, but (2) not provide the additional benefits credit cards
provide. These benefits are discussed in Part IV infra, and
include increased sales, reduced payment delays or defaults,
reduced merchant collection costs, improved transaction flow,
and assistance with accounting.74
Accepting credit cards may thus lead a merchant to
decrease its retail prices if the relative net costs of non-credit-card
payment mechanisms that the merchant accepts exceed the net
cost of credit cards. 75 To determine the net cost, one must
subtract from the out-of-pocket expenses of accepting a payment
mechanism – on which the FRBB authors rely – the incremental
benefits and avoided ancillary costs that the merchant derives
from customers choosing that form of payment compared to the
alternatives. 76 Assuming that retail markets are competitive, these
benefits should translate into consumer benefits through lower
retail prices or quality enhancements, such as faster transactions.
When these merchant benefits are combined with those accruing
to non-credit card consumers as a result of their payment choice
(see infra IV.D.), the FRBB authors’ welfare conclusions are

Id. at 32 (showing that 71.4 percent of checks are written to businesses
from consumers or other businesses); id. at 35 (showing that 79.5 percent of
check value comes from checks written to businesses by consumers or other
businesses).
74
See Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Jansuz A. Ordover, Merchant
Benefits and Public Policy toward Interchange: An Economic Assessment, 1819
(2005)
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2005/antitrust/Guerin_Calver
t_Ordover.pdf (reviewing the empirical evidence and concluding that “the
costs of providing [check verification] services are roughly comparable – if not
somewhat higher – than those for credit card ‘payment guarantee’ services”).
75
In a draft revision of their paper, the FRBB authors recognize that
something other than a 100 percent pass through is possible, but they continue
to assume it as their benchmark. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 19.
76
Julian Wright, The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in
Payment Systems, LII J. OF INDUS. ECON. 1, 18, 20 (2004) (“one cannot
presume . . . that cash-paying customers necessarily pay more as a result of the
existence of more expensive card-paying customers – one has to consider the
additional benefits the cards provide as well”).
73
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significantly undermined.
The following subsections analyze the relative costs and
benefits to merchants of accepting various means of payment,
concluding that disparities producing significant wealth transfers
are unlikely and, if they exist, they are likely to be small and noncredit card users are likely to be better off when the merchants
with whom they deal accept credit cards. Subsequent sections
will then explain how benefits accruing to banks and noncardholding consumers also positively impact consumer welfare
in ways not taken into account by the FRBB authors.
1. The Costs of Accepting Payment Mechanisms
Determining the cost of accepting a means of payment is
more complicated than asking how much a merchant must pay to
a service provider. Any form of payment will create expenses for
the merchant. For example, one tends to think that accepting
cash is free. In fact, cash-accepting merchants bear significant
costs that would not be borne by a merchant, such as an internetonly retailer, that only accepted cards. These costs range from
the time it takes to make change to the costs of counting the cash
and making deposits, to theft losses and the cost of insuring
against them. 77 For example, a Food Marketing Research study
calculated that the cost of cash acceptance was 1.9% of a $100
transaction without taking account of uncompensated theft losses
or incremental insurance costs as a result of cash acceptance. 78
Under a unitary retail pricing policy, a non-cash purchaser must
help cover these expenses, just as a cash-paying customer
contributes to the merchant’s cost of accepting credit cards.
To determine the direction of any subsidy, one must look to
the relative net costs of various means of payment. The FRBB
Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)application
of Economics of Two-sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 538
(2005) (explaining that “[c]ash, for instance, imposes costs on retailers and
consumers that electronic payment systems do not. One example is the labor
cost associated with counting cash and reconciling the cash register drawer. As
labor costs increase, the cost of cash payments to retailers becomes more
expensive relative to electronic payments. In addition, cash has a higher risk of
theft and loss for both consumers and merchants (from employee malfeasance).
The costs associated with collecting and transporting cash safely, most notably
armored cars, do not exist for payment cards”).
78
FRONTIER ECONOMICS, JOINT BANK REVIEW OF CREDIT CARD
MEMBERSHIP AND INTERCHANGE FEES: REPORT ON CREDIT CARD
INTERCHANGE FEES TO REVIEW BANKS 22 (2001).
77
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authors assume a 1.5% difference between credit cards, on the
one hand, and a blended rate for all other means of payment, on
the other. 79 Although they purport to rely on sophisticated cost
studies, 80 the variation in these studies reveals that there is no
accepted method of calculating the relative costs of payment
mechanisms. Moreover, at average transaction volumes, these
studies generally calculate the cost difference between credit
cards and other means of payment at less than 1% of the retail
price. 81
Even this low percentage is likely to be overstated – and
may point in the wrong direction entirely – given the potential for
ancillary cost savings flowing from card acceptance. As the
economists Guerin-Calvert and Ordover have explained,
“academic papers assessing interchange fees and the efficiency
and welfare effects of various outcomes are necessarily based on
stripped down models that do not capture the richness of the
markets at issue.” 82 As a result, they have tended to
underestimate the ancillary cost savings that merchants enjoy
because they accept credit cards. 83
The principal ancillary cost savings from credit card
acceptance encompass payment verification and credit extension.
Were merchants to forego card acceptance, most would continue
to desire means to continue verifying payments and extending
credit. Some larger merchants may be able to perform these
functions for themselves, though many could not. And while
third-party providers exist, the size and ubiquity of credit card
FRBB, supra note 1, at 13. Even using the authors’ own number, the
impact of card rewards is far less significant than the fee difference. Although
the authors favor eliminating all card rewards, id. at 34, their analysis predicts
that doing so would ameliorate only 1.4% of the markup consumers
purportedly pay as a result of credit card use. Id. at 29, 32, 36-37 (merchant fee
more influential than rewards). Of course, eliminating card rewards would
entirely eliminate the consumer welfare gains now enjoyed by those using
these cards.
80
David Humphrey et al., What Does It Cost to Make a Payment?, 2 REV.
OF NETWORK ECON. 159, 162-63 (2003); Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, Robert W.
Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Economics of a Cashless Society: An
Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments, 5 REV. OF NET.
ECON. 199, at 203, 208, 213-14 (2006), available at http://www.aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1048.
81
Id.; Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 74, at 26 (citing a 2004 study
finding that the cost of processing a $100 transaction with a credit card was
only 21 cents more than processing a cash transaction of a similar size).
82
Id. at 9.
83
Id.
79

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

2012

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Assessing Credit Card Rewards

51

networks take advantage of economies of scale and scope that are
inaccessible to even the largest merchants or third-party
providers. 84 Substitute verification and authorization services are
thus likely to be inferior to those provided by credit card
networks and “substantially exceed the implicit price that
merchants [now pay] . . . to payments networks.” 85 The ancillary
costs that merchants would have to bear if they did not accept
credit cards could thus outweigh any additional out-of-pocket
costs that those merchants must pay. The next section will look
more broadly at the benefits that card acceptance provides to
merchants.
2. Potential for Wealth Transfers Considering Merchant
Benefits
The FRBB authors’ analysis attributes their predicted
consumer welfare loss to merchant card acceptance fees, which
the authors assume to be higher than the costs merchants bear
when customers use other forms of payment. In that simple world
where card acceptance simply increases costs, one might conclude
that consumers would be better off without credit cards.
Considering that merchants may receive benefits from cards that
can impact overall pricing decisions and consumer welfare, the
issue becomes more complicated. This sub-section considers how
the benefits that merchants receive from accepting cards might
benefit all consumers. It then focuses on the FRBB authors’
claim that reward cards are the primary culprits in transferring
wealth from low- to high-income households.
a. The Merchant Benefits of Credit Card Acceptance
Credit card use provides a merchant with prompt,
guaranteed payment and may, among other things, increase sales,
reduce instances of non- and late-payment, lower theft insurance
costs, and improve customer flow at the point of sale and various
aspects of accounting. 86 Although these benefits are almost
84
Id. at 13-25 (reviewing the services credit card networks provide to
merchants that would be more costly and less effective if merchants needed to
acquire them from other sources).
85
Id. at 11-12.
86
Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A. Ordover, Merchant Benefits
and Public Policy Towards Interchange: An Economic Assessment 4 REV.
NETWORK ECON. 384, 387, 391-407 (2006).
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certainly real and substantial, they are difficult, if not impossible,
to measure precisely. A merchant may experience them in
complex ways that evolve over time and that are difficult to
isolate from other causes. As a result, the benefits of credit card
use may be difficult even for the merchant itself to quantify. The
cost of card acceptance is immediate, while the benefits of
increased sales and savings from prompt payment and reduced
default are delayed and difficult to isolate from other potential
causes. For example, if a merchant begins accepting cards at the
start of an economic downturn, purchase volume may fall,
payments may be less timely, and default rates may increase in
absolute terms. Card acceptance may nevertheless have lessened
the impact of each negative event in ways that would be hard for
the merchant to perceive, much less measure. Nevertheless, the
merchant’s prices could be lower than they would have been if it
had never accepted cards.
Although a definitive empirical measure of the net costs of
various means of payment will not be readily forthcoming,
analysis may still shed light on the likelihood of significant wealth
transfers. The most significant incremental benefit of credit card
use is the potential to increase sales. 87 Obviously, an easily
accessible line of credit will enable some consumers to make
purchases that they could not otherwise make because of thenexisting resource constraints and the relatively high cost of
obtaining other forms of credit. 88 In addition, some research
indicates that psychological factors lead credit card users to spend
more than they otherwise would, even when resource constraints
do not exist. 89 A 1996 Ernst and Young survey, for example,
found that merchants have recognized this effect for some time:
83% indicated that accepting credit cards would increase sales

See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
Importantly, the cost of obtaining credit cannot be gauged solely by the
interest rate. Convenience is also a critical factor. For example, both home
equity and pay-day loans require substantial up-front investments of time and
planning that are not required of customers using credit cards.
89
See Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Monopoly Money: The Effect
of Payment Coupling and Form on Spending Behavior, 14 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 213 (2008); see also Adam J. Levitin, The
Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and
The Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 288 (2005) (explaining
that with credit cards consumers will “make more purchases because they feel
less constrained in credit spending than they do when spending cash on hand”);
Levitin, supra note 52, at 38-39.
87
88
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and 58% thought accepting credit cards would increase profits. 90
Currently, business consultants are advising merchants that
accepting cards will increase their sales, and an ever-growing
collection of merchants appear to be reaching that conclusion. 91
Two long-time holdouts, The Waffle House and Neiman Marcus,
recently agreed to accept credit cards, 92 and New York City taxis
reported that introducing card acceptance increased both
ridership and tips substantially and, three years into the program,
these effects have persisted and total revenue and the percentage
of riders paying by card has increased significantly. 93 There have
been reports that accepting cards significantly increased the
average amount spent at McDonald’s, 94 and even the Salvation
Chakravorti & Emmons, supra note 44, at 213 (citing Ernst & Young,
Survey of Retail Payment Systems, Chain Store Age, (1996)).
91
Appendix at II.A. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review.
See, e.g., Chris Rempel, Are You Losing Business by Only Accepting Cash and
Checks,
http://ezinearticles.com/?Are-You-Losing-Business-by-OnlyAccepting-Cash-and-Checks?&id=669109.
92
Appendix at II.I & J. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review.
Nick Vagnoni, Waffle House to accept credit cards, SLASHFOOD (Feb. 21,
2006) available at http://www.slashfood.com/2006/02/21/waffle-house-toaccept-credit-cards; Dana Mattioli, Hoity-Toity to Hoi Polloi: Neiman Takes
More Plastic, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011) available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020450530457700010335567144
4.html.
93
Appendix at II.B. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Ted Mann, More Decide
to Charge a Taxi Ride, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020452020457724785069434984
4.html; Michael M. Grynbaum, New York’s Cabbies Like Credit Cards? Go
Figure,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/nyregion/08taxi.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=cr
edit%20card&st=cse&.
94
J.D. Roth, Research Reveals Credit Cards Encourage Spending, GET
RICH
SLOWLY
(Sept.
23,
2008),
http://www.getrichslowly.org/blog/2008/09/23/research-reveals-credit-cardsencourage-spending. (quoting Cornell University economics professor Robert
Frank as stating “When McDonald’s started allowing credit card purchases,
the average purchase went from $4.50 up to $7.00”).
90
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Army has experienced an increase in kettle donations during the
holiday season after installing an option to donate using a card. 95
Reward cards are likely to increase spending even more
than non-reward credit cards. After all, the Phoenix Marketing
survey data confirms that reward cards effectively lower prices
for the cardholders who use them. 96 Interestingly, retail
merchants and travel and entertainment companies apparently
agree with credit card issuers that loyalty programs increase
consumer spending, offering their own reward programs in
numbers that outstrip those offered by financial service
companies. 97 In some cases, proprietary store cards offer rewards
that are larger than those available from credit cards. 98 To be
sure, merchants capture all the gain from their own reward
programs. The point, however, is that merchants recognize the
value of these programs to their own marketing efforts and thus
critics of reward cards should bear the burden of distinguishing
financial services from other businesses with respect to the value
of loyalty programs. In short, if merchants recognize that
rewarding their customers helps expand their own businesses,
similar programs should also be a good way to expand the credit
Appendix at II.C. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Jessica Leving,
Salvation Army kettles can now accept credit cards, USA TODAY (Nov. 26,
2011) available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-26salvation-army-credit-cards_N.htm.
96
See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on file with the Consumer Law
Review.
97
Appendix at II.D. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Leo Jakobson, Retailers
Hold Lion’s Share of U.S. Loyalty Program Memberships, INCENTIVE: WHAT
MOTIVATES
(June
16,
2009)
available
at
http://www.incentivemag.com/IncentivePrograms/Consumer/Articles/Retailers-Hold-Lion-s-Share-of-U-S—LoyaltyProgram-Memberships/.
98
Appendix at II.F. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. (For example, Best Buy
offers a reward card offering four percent). FINANCING & AWARDS, BEST
BUY,
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Finance/CreditCards/pcmcat102500050032.c?id=pcmcat102500050032 (last visited Oct. 26,
2012).
95
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card business.
If credit card use and rewards increase consumer
spending, it could effectively lower retail prices. Higher sales
levels would enable retailers to spread their fixed costs over
greater sales volume. This cost spreading and savings would tend
to reduce retail prices. If credit cards lead to sufficient increases
in customer spending, the benefits to merchants could outweigh
the incremental out-of-pocket costs of credit cards, and a
merchant that starts accepting credit cards might thus leave its
retail prices the same or even lower them despite higher out-ofpocket card acceptance fees. 99
Precisely the same analysis would apply to merchants who
are able to secure payments more quickly and avoid defaults by
accepting credit cards. A merchant could reduce its own
borrowing costs and losses due to non-payment as well as costs
associated with pursuing customers who would eventually pay
without credit cards, but pay more quickly with them. And again,
the merchant could spread its fixed costs over more (and more
timely) completed sales.
One might be tempted to argue that credit cards must
have lower net costs than other forms of payment, because if they
did not, merchants would simply refuse to accept them.
Economists have cautioned, however, that a particular
merchant’s perceived increase in sales volume as a result of credit
card acceptance may be the result of shifting sales among
merchants rather than actual increases in consumption levels.
This is true because merchants use card acceptance strategically
in order to attract sales away from, and avoid losing sales to, their
competitors. This strategic behavior provides the merchant a
private benefit – sales that would otherwise have gone to
competitors – but not necessarily an increase in total consumer
spending.100 As a result, a merchant may accept cards despite a
99
Levitin, supra note 52, at 28 (recognizing the credit card use could lead
to lower prices if it “increases sales sufficiently”).
100
See Katz, supra note 39, at 26-27; id. at 10 (“An individual merchant
may recognize that failure to accept a major general purpose credit card would
lead potential customers to patronize rival merchants that accept those
customers’ preferred cards. Hence, from the individual merchant’s
perspective, card acceptance generates significant additional sales benefits.
The benefits to the overall economy, however, depend on the effects on
merchants as a whole (in addition to effects on consumers). It is easy to see that
the collective effects may be very different from the individual effects. The
reason, of course, is that the merchant’s acceptance decision may have
negative effects on rival merchants; the merchant accepts credit cards in part
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net cost above other means of payment, because failing to accept
them would lead to lost sales that would reduce profits even more
than card acceptance.
If merchants in a particular industry accept cards for
strategic reasons, prices throughout that industry could be higher
with credit card acceptance than without it. Nevertheless, noncredit card users may still be better off if the stores at which they
shop accept credit cards. To understand why this is true, assume
that a merchant accepts cards only because it believes that it has
to do so to avoid losing customers to competitive merchants. Such
a merchant would know that card acceptance would cost more
than other means of payment and any increase in sales or other
benefits would not outweigh the higher incremental out-of-pocket
cost. Nevertheless, the merchant counter-intuitively chooses to
accept cards because failing to do so would cause it to lose sales to
competitors, reducing its profits, and forcing it to increase its
prices on remaining sales to cover its fixed costs, to an even
greater extent than would card acceptance.
In this case, the merchant’s prices with credit card
acceptance would be higher than they would be in a hypothetical
world in which no merchant in the industry accepted credit cards.
In the real world in which competitors do accept cards, however,
prices would be lower if the merchant also accepts them. From
the perspective of non-card customers, if some stores accept credit
cards, then non-credit card users would be better off when the
stores at which they shop also accept them. This is particularly
true given that most consumers are not strictly card users or noncard users. Virtually all consumers use multiple means of
payment, including credit cards. 101 Even those who usually pay
another way benefit from the option to use a credit card when
they need to.
This conclusion depends on the relationship between the
effect of card acceptance on merchant sales and the incremental
costs of accepting cards. Minimal data exists shedding light on
this question, but both (a) the paucity of non-credit-cardaccepting merchants in most retail sectors and (b) the
continuously expanding base of merchants across business sectors

to take business away from its rivals. Thus, the collective benefits of a
merchant’s accepting credit and charge cards may be much lower than the
merchant’s individual benefits”).
101
See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on file with the Consumer Law
Review.
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that have begun taking payments with cards suggests that card
acceptance by a particular retailer leads to higher profits and
potentially lower prices whether or not other merchants in that
sector accept credit cards. If a merchant could actually charge a
significantly lower price, and thereby maintain or increase its
sales and profits by not accepting cards, one would expect to see
non-credit-card-accepting merchants seeking to attract
consumers by under-cutting the prices of credit-accepting
merchants. 102 Although merchant fees have moved up and down
over time, even during periods of substantial increases, 103 retailers
virtually never pursue this competitive response. In fact, the
trend in card acceptance has been in the opposite direction. Retail
sectors that previously did not accept credit cards –supermarkets,
convenience stores, utilities, insurance companies, and health
care providers – now do, while no sector, or individual major
retailer, has stopped accepting credit cards because of fee
increases. 104
b. Wealth Transfers With Merchant Benefits & Rewards
The FRBB authors do not recommend eliminating card
acceptance. Instead, they focus their attack on reward cards. One
might contend that even if merchants benefit from card
acceptance generally in ways that lower consumer prices, the
102
Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, The Neutrality of Interchange Fees
in Payment Systems 21 (Melbourne Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2001-03,
2001),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276228#PaperDownload
(“the cash price from a credit card merchant will also make cash-only
merchants appear to be relatively cheap for those customers that use cash as
well as credit”).
103
United States v. VISA U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp.2d 322, 340 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding that “both Visa and MasterCard have recently raised
interchange rates charged to merchants a number of times, without losing a
single merchant customer as a result”); see Evans & Schmalensee, supra note
21, at 126; James M. Lyon, The Interchange Fee Debate: Issues and
Economics, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION, June 2006,
available
at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/06-06/
interchange.cfm.
104
VISA U.S.A., 163 F. Supp.2d at 340 (finding that merchants have not
stopped accepting credit cards despite fee increases); but see Katz, supra note
39, at 24 (finding that economies of scale may require merchants to accept
cards in markets that are too small to support separate credit-card and noncredit card merchants. But economies of scale cannot explain the paucity of
non-credit-card merchants even in big cities).
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FRBB authors might still reasonably assume that merchants
receive no net benefit from card rewards. Virtually all purchases
made with a reward card, they might contend, would still be
made even if the merchant did not accept the card because the
customer could always use a less expensive ordinary credit
card. 105 The incremental cost of reward cards would thus lead to
a wealth transfer because high-income households use the most
expensive reward cards. 106
Reward cards, however, may well provide merchants with
incremental sales increases that would not occur in a market
without them. Cardholders earning rewards effectively face a
lower price for the products and services that they buy. Available
data from the Phoenix Marketing Survey of consumer payment
system use reflects that spending is higher on reward cards than
non-reward cards.107
Even if reward cards do not increase overall spending,
however, non-card-using consumers are still likely to be better off
if a merchant accepts them. If one merchant stopped accepting
reward cards, it would likely lose sales to competitors that
strategically continued to accept them in order to attract the
business of reward-card-holding high-income households. 108 The
reward-card-refusing merchant would lose the patronage of some
of its best customers, possibly causing it to raise its prices to cover
its fixed costs, and leaving non-reward card users worse off than
they would have been if the merchant had simply accepted all
credit cards.
This analysis cannot establish that the merchants’ benefits
of card acceptance at current usage and fee levels in fact enable
those merchants to charge lower prices than they would if they
did not accept credit cards generally (or reward cards in
Levitin, supra note 52, at 15-16. (arguing many of the same policy
proposals as the FRBB authors).
106
Id. at 34-35.
107
Appendix at I.I. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review.
108
Barron et al., supra note 36, at 16, 18-19 (explaining that the decision to
offer cash discounts depended on the relative elasticity of cash and credit
customers which differed across stations. Interestingly, this is exactly what
happened in the gasoline retailing market when it experimented with cash
discounts. While some stations trumped discounts for cash purchases, others,
including those selling under the banner of the giant Shell Oil, touted the same
price for cash or credit).
105
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particular). Given the relatively small differences in out-of-pocket
costs between credit cards and other means of payment, however,
the potential ancillary cost savings and benefits identified here
create at least a reasonable possibility that credit card acceptance
leads to lower prices in some retail markets. Furthermore, the
disappearance of non-credit-card-accepting merchants across the
economy suggests that even if credit cards increase prices overall,
a particular merchant’s refusal to accept them would cause it to
increase its prices even more. In a world that includes reward
credit cards, non-reward-card users are likely to be better off if
the stores at which they shop accept them.
c. Credit Card System Bank Benefits
In addition to ignoring merchant benefits, the FRBB
authors’ analysis does not account for the benefits of card
rewards to banks. Credit card systems operated for many years
without reward programs, and no network rule requires card
issuers to offer them. Just as merchants choose to accept cards for
a reason, the banks choose to offer reward programs because they
perceive some benefit that is unaccounted for in the FRBB policy
paper’s analysis.
Although the authors did not incorporate bank benefits
into their original analysis, they later assumed that reward
programs increase bank profits and benefit the primarily highincome households that hold bank stock. 109 They thus concluded
that incorporating bank benefits into their analysis would
exacerbate the wealth transfer. But that view inappropriately
focuses narrowly on distributed profits. Banks reinvest credit
card system profits in ways that benefit all consumers, such as
more effective fraud protection, enhanced security, and systems
that speed up transactions at the point of sale.
Most obviously, reward programs that stimulate card
usage have made card networks larger and more efficient,
thereby lowering the networks’ operating costs. Perhaps more
significantly, a bank may offer a card rewards program because it
enables the bank to increase revenue from financing purchases
and cardholder fees. By offering rewards, for example, banks
may entice cardholders to pay an annual fee that they would not
otherwise pay or run larger balances then they otherwise would.
Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 20 (assuming that the distribution of
ownership of bank stock was similar to the distribution of stocks generally).
109

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

60

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Vol. 25:1

The Phoenix International Marketing consumer survey confirms
that card issuers earn more revenue from these sources than they
do from merchant fees. 110
Banks may then use this revenue – which is attributable,
directly or indirectly, to reward programs – to expand services
and offer new and improved products (relating to credit cards
and otherwise) that could benefit all consumers.
Merchants often contend that a more efficient card system
should have led to lower merchant fees, but competitive markets
do not work in such a static way. Banks must approach the credit
card market dynamically, constantly focusing on the competitive
steps that will best improve the system. If lowering merchant fees
would more efficiently expand the system, banks would
undoubtedly lower those fees. The card systems’ unqualified
success, however, testifies to the correctness of the banks’
decision to focus generally on expanding services to cardholders
rather than lowering merchant fees.
The banking sector innovations made possible by a more
profitable credit card system could benefit low-income
households more than high-income households, thus
counteracting the wealth transfer predicted by the FRBB policy
paper. For example, greater credit card use benefits banks by
making cards attractive to more merchants, increasing card
transaction volume and presumably card borrowing. In recent
years, this benefit has been realized as new merchant sectors have
begun accepting credit cards, including utilities, medical service
providers, taxing authorities, and insurance companies. These
sectors, which generally provide non-discretionary products, may
not value the credit component of the card system to expand sales
as traditional retailers do. Nevertheless, cards may benefit these
merchants in other ways, including enabling their customers to
make more timely payments, and decreasing non-payment and
default risk, as well as collection costs. In short, credit card use
shifts these costs and risks from merchants to banks, an extremely
valuable benefit.
Low-income households may be more likely to face cash
flow issues leading to late payment or default, the penalties
attendant thereto, and ultimately reduced credit ratings. These
low-income customers are thus more likely to benefit from
expanded card acceptance for non-discretionary spending than
Appendix at I.D through H. See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on
file with the Consumer Law Review.
110
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high-income households. Although they use credit cards less often
than high-income households, the ability to pay merchants in
these sectors that are new to card acceptance with a credit card
could enable low-income households to avoid late payment and
maintain or even improve their credit ratings – the latter of which
would reduce the low-income households’ future costs of
borrowing.
d. Non-credit Card Customer Benefits
The FRBB authors assume that credit card use benefits
only those who receive rewards. Allocating and assessing the
value of a means of payment to all customers, however, is a much
more complex endeavor. First, the costs and benefits of one
payment mechanism often spill over, impacting customers who
use other means of payment in ways that go beyond retail prices
and rewards. 111 An example of an easily observable spillover
involves cash acceptance. Some supermarkets now use change
dispensers that speed up checkout lines. Although this cost is
directly attributable to the merchant’s acceptance of cash, the
benefits of faster check-out times extend to all customers.
Similarly, when increased credit card use reduces a merchant’s
cash handling costs, late- and non-payment expenses (such as
bounced check expenses), and theft losses, all customers
benefit. 112
111
See Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 387, 391-407 (“It is
not at all clear that these complex bundles of benefits can be neatly converted
into a ‘per transaction’ benefit with a well-calibrated cost”); Katz, supra note
39, at 35 (“card based transactions may have costs and benefits for both sides
of the market simultaneously, many costs are common”).
112
Although these types of benefits could be obtained with other
electronic forms of payment, such as pin-based debit cards, that would impose
lower out-of-pocket costs on merchants once the technology for acceptance is
installed, the same level of benefits would not be obtained without credit
cards. Debit card use would be unlikely to replace reduced credit card use on a
dollar-for-dollar basis for at least three reasons:
(1) many consumers need, or prefer, the float period or revolving credit
offered by credit cards;
(2) others value the security of maintaining their level of cash on hand in case
an emergency expense arises for which they cannot use a credit card; and
(3) some fear that fraudulent use of their debit card would have more severe
consequences than credit card fraud. With respect to this last factor, the most
significant difference is that debit fraud can empty the cardholder’s checking
account, leaving her without access to her money for some indeterminable
period of time. By contrast, credit card fraud does not raise that concern
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Second, the FRBB authors’ data shows that consumers
use reward cards sometimes at all wealth levels. The majority of
consumers – again at all wealth levels – however, choose not to
use reward credit cards for the majority of their purchases. The
FRBB authors do not contend that these consumer payment
decisions are irrational. On the contrary, consumers likely make
considered decisions about which payment system to use based
on the welfare that each provides to them with respect to
particular purchases. Just as merchants choose to accept
particular means of payment because of the perceived benefits,
consumers use payment mechanisms other than reward credit
cards in the circumstances in which they perceive a net benefit
from doing so.
Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, they are
relatively easy to predict. Recall that the authors place consumers
using debit cards, proprietary store cards, gift cards, and checks
as well as cash, in the same category. Many consumers use debit
cards instead of credit cards because they do not want to take on
a credit balance and are concerned that, if given the option to
revolve, they will not pay their credit card bill in full. These
consumers, however, often do use credit cards when they need to
extend payments. More extensive use of credit cards by others
ensures that a safe and efficient system is available when these
consumers choose to use it.
Moreover, debit card users may also receive rewards. And
proprietary store cards may offer rewards that are greater than
credit cards. 113 Cash purchasers may simply enjoy being the
customer who uses cash when others are using cards. If these
benefits did not exist, many consumers who now choose not to
use reward credit cards would likely use them, reducing the
FRBB authors’ predicted welfare transfer.
The authors’ failure to consider the spillover benefits of
reward card use causes them to overstate any potential wealth
transfer. Moreover, their failure to take account of the
individualized benefits received by those choosing not to use a
reward credit card casts doubt on whether any transfer the
authors may show is actually a “wealth transfer” in any
meaningful sense. The consumers who are said to be losing
because a credit card issuer has no direct access to the cardholder’s deposit
accounts.
113
Appendix at II.F (showing example of the Best Buy credit card); see
BEST BUY, supra note 98.
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wealth through reward card use choose a different means of
payment because they believe that it provides them greater
benefits than they would receive if they used a reward card.
e. The Impact of Ignoring the Benefits of Payment System
Choices
The benefits of payment system choices impact how
reward credit cards affect welfare. Yet, the FRBB authors ignore
many of these benefits. Given that their analysis only takes
account of card rewards and redistributed profits to wealthy
stockholders, the authors’ prediction that a wealth transfer favors
high-income households is as unsurprising as it is unilluminating.
To be sure, many of the benefits of payment system choices are
difficult to measure, and the authors’ goal was to make precise
consumer welfare predictions. That goal, however, may simply be
unachievable. “It is not at all clear,” economists Meg GuerinCalvert and Jansuz Ordover have observed, “that complex of
bundles of benefits [resulting from credit card use] can be neatly
converted into a ‘per transaction’ benefit with a well-calibrated
cost.” 114 As Michael Katz has explained “card based transactions
may have costs and benefits for both sides of the market
simultaneously, many costs are common.” 115
The analysis presented here cannot establish that reward
credit card use increases consumer welfare. But it does show that
a meaningful assessment of consumer welfare would require
analysts to consider inputs that the FRBB authors ignore.
Payment system markets are not a zero sum game; the amount
and size of transactions are not independent of the choice of
payment mechanism. 116 To the extent that cardholders would
Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 387.
Katz, supra note 39, at 35.
116
Ronald J. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND
REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 48 (2006); Ronald J. Levitin,
supra note 52, at 38-39 (citing studies); Levitin, supra note 89, at 288
(explaining that with credit cards consumers will “make more purchases
because they feel less constrained in credit spending than they do when
spending cash on hand”). Although the strength of this effect is apparently
difficult to prove it seems likely to be substantial. Katz, supra note 39, at 9-12,
19 (questioning whether credit cards really increase overall spending). If it
were not, one would expect to see cash-only merchants emerge to take
advantage of the cost savings that such merchants could provide to consumers.
Cf. Gans & King, supra note 102, at 21 (“the cash price from a credit card
merchant will also make cash-only merchants appear to be relatively cheap for
114
115
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switch away from credit cards if rewards were reduced or
eliminated, the FRBB authors predict that merchant card
acceptance costs and retail prices would drop accordingly. But
when consumers stop using reward cards, they are likely to spend
less and impose other types of costs, such as bad check losses, on
merchants. These costs and lost revenue would restrain a
merchant’s ability to cut its prices by the full amount of the
reduction in card acceptance fees. The impact of the authors’
proposed regulatory interventions on consumer welfare is thus
highly uncertain.

V. ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING THE FRBB
AUTHORS’ CONSUMER-WELFARE CALCULATION
The previous section addressed the effect of the FRBB
policy paper’s failure to take account of the full spectrum of
benefits, other than credit card rewards, flowing to merchants,
banks, and non-credit card customers from existing payment
system choices. This section shows that even if those effects could
plausibly be ignored in calculating changes to consumer welfare –
which they cannot – the FRBB paper’s predictions would still
rest on a set of arbitrary assumptions about the value of payment
system choices and of shifting wealth between income groups.
First, the FRBB authors assume that merchants pay card
acceptance fees of approximately 2% and face a cost of .5% to
handle cash, a category in which they include all means of
payment other than credit cards. 117 Merchants’ out-of-pocket
costs to accept different means of payment vary across merchant
types, and the authors acknowledge that their figures are “very
rough.” 118 They cite research estimating the cost of accepting noncredit-card payment mechanisms along a range from .5% to
1.6%. 119 Without attempting to evaluate rigorously the accuracy
of these numbers, the authors adopt the lower end of the range,
maximizing the possibility that they will overstate any wealth
transfer. To the extent that merchant costs for (1) non-credit card
transactions are higher or (2) credit card transactions are lower,

those customers that use cash as well as credit”). In fact, the trend has been
entirely in the opposite direction as more and more merchants accept credit
cards.
117
Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 11.
118
Id. at 12.
119
Id.
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the FRBB authors’ calculations would overstate any wealth
transfer and thus any change in consumer welfare. One reason to
suspect that the authors’ assumption understates the merchant
costs of the payment mechanisms used by low-income households
is that those households use debit cards more often than highincome households, leveling out card use considerably across
income groups. 120
The merchant cost of accepting debit cards may be higher
than the cost of cash, and consumers are often rewarded for debit
card use. By lumping debit card use in with cash use, the FRBB
authors may overstate the differences in payment system costs
imposed on merchants between high- and low-income groups.
Second, the authors assume that merchants generally
charge a single price for their goods and services regardless of the
means of payment. Although they cite no hard data establishing
the accuracy of this assumption, it appears to comport with
general experience. But exceptions exist. Some small merchants
offer cash discounts, and many large retail stores offer proprietary
store cards (which fall on the “cash” side of the FRBB authors’
analysis) that provide rewards and other significant consumer
benefits. 121 To the extent that these programs lead merchants to
charge credit card purchasers more than customers using other
payment mechanisms, the authors’ wealth transfer and consumer
welfare predictions are again overstated.
Third, and perhaps most critically, the FRBB authors’
accounting exercise predicts only a transfer of money, not
welfare. Their hard data fails to show any inefficiency or dead
weight loss that would make consumers objectively worse off.
The authors simply conclude that dollars flow from one pocket to
another because of the choices that merchants and consumers
make about which payment mechanisms to accept and use,
respectively.
To make the broader claim that this monetary transfer
Appendix at I.B.C. (See Phoenix Marketing International Survey Data
on file with the Consumer Law Review (showing that 94-97% of households
have a credit or debit card at all income levels above $20,000 annually, and
83% of households below that level have one type of card or the other).
121
Appendix at II.E. (See Phoenix Marketing International Survey Data
on file with the Consumer Law Review, for example, Macy’s offers a 20
percent discount on the day a new card account is opened). See CREDIT CARD
APPLICATION,
MACY’S,
https://www.macys.com/service/credit/applynow/creditapp.ognc (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012).
120
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reduces overall consumer welfare, the authors must move beyond
calculations based on hard data and assume two contestable, if
not entirely arbitrary, facts about consumer preferences. First,
they assume that preferences for card use are uniformly
distributed across consumers. Second, they assume that money
held by low-income households produces a specific amount of
additional overall welfare compared to money held by highincome households. These two assumptions are both critical to
their conclusions and independent from the data on which they
rely. Changes to either one could dramatically change their
calculations of the consumer welfare impact of card usage.
With respect to the distribution of consumer preferences
for card use, the data show how often consumers at various
income levels choose to use credit cards or alternative means of
payment. But the data say nothing about the relative preference
levels of various consumers for the alternative means of payment.
The FRBB authors assume that the strength of the preference for
a means of payment is uniform across all consumers regardless of
income, which impacts their specific consumer welfare
predictions. 122
The authors fail to articulate a reason to believe that this
assumption is true. Preferences could reasonably be distributed in
other ways that would significantly influence the FRBB authors’
welfare predictions. For example, many high-income consumers
choosing to use credit cards could have a very slight preference
for them because they use cards only for marginal convenience
benefits or rewards, while low-income consumers choosing
another means of payment might have a very strong preference
such as the need to manage their use of credit. When this is the
case, consumer welfare would not change as a result of card use
in the way that the authors predict. Similarly, because consumers
in both income groups often choose both means of payment, it is
possible that the low-income consumers who use credit cards
have much stronger preferences for them than the high-income
consumers who use cards. This might occur if low-income
households perceived card rewards as particularly welcome
windfalls generating more utility for them than the higher
absolute reward payments generate for high-income households.
The negative welfare effects of denying these benefits to the lowwealth consumers who use reward cards could potentially
outweigh any benefits to low-wealth consumers who use cash,
122

Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 27 fig. 3.
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particularly if other flaws in the FRBB Report’s analysis reduce
the magnitude of the transfer.
The point here is not that either of these possible
distributions of consumer preferences is necessarily more likely to
be accurate than the one chosen by the FRBB authors. It is
simply that no one knows, and the value one chooses has a
significant impact on the predicted welfare changes. The impact
of regulatory intervention would thus be uncertain.
This uncertainty is magnified by the variability of another
critical component of the FRBB authors’ welfare calculations.
Recall that the authors accounting exercise predicts a simple
movement of money from one pocket to another, rather than an
overall welfare loss to the economy. If one dollar produced the
same amount of welfare regardless of who had it, the authors’
transfer predictions would have no impact whatsoever on
aggregate consumer welfare. To obtain a welfare impact, they
must assume that a dollar is worth more to a low-income
household than to a high-income household. That assumption is
hardly implausible, but it is nonetheless problematic on three
levels.
First, assuming that low-income households value a dollar
more than high-income households creates a paradox. Why
would households valuing money more choose to use payment
mechanisms that cost them more? The reason is not that lowincome households have no access to credit cards. Although the
limits and terms are set based on the risk posed and card issuer
policies differ widely, in almost all cases, even low-income
households could use credit cards. 123 But they nonetheless choose
to use them less often than high-income households. Two
plausible reasons for that choice would undermine the FRBB
policy paper’s welfare predictions: (1) credit card rewards are
Levitin, supra note 52, at 14 (“almost anyone who wants a rewards
card can get one.”); see id. at 6 (Phoenix Marketing Group chart showing that
consumers hold a higher percentage of reward cards than non-reward cards at
all income groups). Even individuals who have recently declared bankruptcy
have no problem obtaining credit cards, though many choose not to.
Katherine Porter, The Debt Dilemma: Reviewing Ronald J. Mann, Charging
Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets (2006), 106
MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2008) (explaining that “nearly every consumer has
access to a credit card. Card issuers have used price differentiation and
technology to offer cards to nearly every segment of the market, a strategy that
banks have not deployed for many conventional lending products.”); id. at
1181 (recognizing that “the rampant marketing of credit cards to families after
bankruptcy means nearly everyone can get a credit card”).
123
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valued much less highly than the paper makes them out to be,
and perhaps are valued even less highly by low-income than by
high-income households, or (2) low-income households do not
systematically garner more welfare from consumption than highincome households.
Second, making interpersonal utility comparisons is not a
matter of traditional economics, which instead tends to focus on
more objective criteria like Pareto optimality or economic
efficiency. The reason for this typical restraint in economic
analysis is that it is impossible to know how one should value a
shift in levels of utility across individuals without making an
arbitrary assumption. 124
Third, even if one agreed that relative welfare levels could
appropriately be incorporated into an economic analysis of
welfare transfers, the question would remain as to the magnitude
of the effect. The FRBB authors acknowledge that they have no
tools capable of answering that question. Ultimately, they
conclude that this parameter in their analysis “can be interpreted
equivalently as a measure of the economy’s aversion to income
inequality.” 125 But the economy is not inherently averse to
inequality. Societies must make value judgments about it, and
many assumptions differing from the authors would (1) be
entirely plausible and (2) significantly impact the welfare effects
that they predict.
The bottom line is that even if the authors took account of
all the relevant factors in payment system markets – which they
do not – their specific consumer welfare predictions would
ultimately rest not on the hard data that they have gathered, but
on arbitrary and controversial assumptions about consumer and
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 10-11
(2d ed. 1963), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cm/m12-2/m12-2all.pdf. A half century ago, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow explained the
problem with basing analysis on inter-personal utility comparisons. Even if,
for some reason, we should admit the measurability of utility for an individual,
there still remains the question of aggregating the individual utilities. . . . In
general there seems to be no method intrinsic to utility measurement, which
will make the choices compatible. It requires a definite value judgment not
derivable from individual sensations to make the utilities of different
individuals dimensionally compatible and still a further value judgment to
aggregate them according to any particular mathematical formula. If we look
away from the mathematical aspects of the matter, it seems to make no sense
to add the utility of one individual, a psychic magnitude in his mind, with the
utility of another individual.
125
Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 33.
124
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societal preferences.

VI. THE UBIQUITY OF WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECTS IN
RETAIL MARKETS
The preceding parts of this paper questioned whether
significant cross subsidies and consumer-welfare shifts exist as a
result of reward credit card use. This section explains that
marketing programs apparently favoring wealthy consumers are
pervasive throughout the retail economy, and the FRBB authors
ignore the question of why regulators should intervene in credit
card markets, but not in any other retail environment producing
an ostensibly similar wealth transfer effect. Other commentators
have attempted to distinguish credit card markets from others in
which similar transfers may occur. This part illustrates that these
efforts have failed. To the extent that payment system markets
differ from other retail markets, regulatory intervention is less
justifiable in the case of credit cards.
A. The Apparent Wealth Transfer Phenomenon
Marketing programs across many sectors of the economy
ostensibly have potential wealth transfer effects similar to those
predicted by the FRBB Report. For example, airline frequent
flier programs likely benefit high-wealth fliers more than lowwealth fliers. Just as merchants charge the same price for goods
and services regardless of means of payment, airlines use the
same fee schedule irrespective of whether a traveler will ever
benefit from a frequent flier reward.
Similarly, many retail merchants offer rewards to frequent
purchasers or proprietary credit card holders. Large supermarket
chains offer discount cards that reward customers who use them
regularly with lower prices than other consumers pay. For
example, Macy’s and Best Buy offer their own credit cards that
include special benefits not available to general-purpose card
users. 126 High-income households may well derive more benefits
from these programs to the extent that they buy more, and more
expensive, goods. These programs impose costs on merchants just
as credit card acceptance imposes costs. If credit cards impose a
wealth transfer, then these programs must as well.
A different sort of wealth transfer could arise whenever a
126

Appendix II.F. See BEST BUY, supra note 98.
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merchant operates multiple locations facing different levels of
competition. For example, a grocery chain may have (a) one store
in a high-income area with numerous competitors in the
geographic market and (b) a second store in a poor area without
any other groceries. The chain would be expected to charge
higher prices in the poor area, effectively transferring wealth
across income groups.
More fundamentally, pervasive consumer amenities have
similar wealth transfer effects. Merchants selling at a unitary
price virtually always provide penumbral products and services
bundled together with their primary wares. For example, when a
supermarket, clothier, or home repair store offers shopping carts
that only certain customers use, the merchant bears the expense
of purchasing and maintaining the carts as well as the cost of
hiring laborers to gather them from the parking lot. 127 Like credit
card fees, the cost of the carts and the attendant services are
blended into the cost of the merchant’s goods and are thus borne
in part by shoppers who buy just a few items and use a bag or
basket. Cart users who would presumably spend more, thus enjoy
a subsidy.
While many of these amenities may not transfer wealth
between income groups, some apparently do. Parking lots, for
example, are a commonly provided benefit that many retail
merchants make available to their customers free of charge.
Wealthy customers with cars take full advantage of the parking
lot, while low-income customers who walk or take the bus
cannot. Since the costs of maintaining the parking lot are blended
into the merchant’s prices – free parking is never really free –
wealth is transferred toward more affluent consumers with cars.
Those who walk effectively pay so that those with cars can park
for free.
Similar amenities – rest rooms, napkins etc. – are
pervasive, but this practice extends beyond these add-ons to core
aspects of the merchant’s business as fundamental as the array of
products offered. Many merchants carry a variety of goods
appealing to different customer groups. To the extent that
inventory costs are uniformly spread across products, those who

David S. Evans, Bank Interchange Fees Balance Dual Demand, AM.
BANKER 17 (Jan. 26, 2001) (“All customers end up paying higher prices as a
result of retailers offering parking, tailoring, escalators, convenient store hours,
gift-wrapping, and many other amenities that are used by only some
customers”).
127
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never purchase items that are more expensive to inventory
subsidize those who buy these high-storage-cost products.
Similarly, a retailer may earn different levels of profit
depending on the type of service provided. For example,
automobile maintenance shops specializing in oil changes may
advertise a low price to change the oil, hoping to convince
customers at the point of sale to also buy a replacement air filter
at a much higher mark up. Customers who only purchase the less
profitable advertised services benefit from subsidies paid by those
who purchase the more profitable services.
Every customer sub-group that benefits from some
particular merchant expenditure effectively imposes a portion of
the merchant’s cost of doing business on other groups of
customers who do not benefit from that expenditure. At its limit,
one might argue that, because small purchases generally impose a
greater proportionate cost on merchants than large ones, the
wealthy who tend to make bigger purchases effectively subsidize
poorer consumers who purchase fewer items.
Economic regulators pervasively ignore merchants’
blending costs into unitary prices in ways that shift wealth. That
practice counsels against concluding that a similar transfer
should be addressed in payment system markets, unless card
acceptance costs differ in some relevant way from other sorts of
merchant expenditures. The following sections show that to the
extent any differences exist, they weigh against intervention in
credit card markets.
B. Attempts to Distinguish Credit Card Wealth Transfers
Although the FRBB authors ignore the pervasive nature
of wealth transfers, other commentators have suggested three
ways in which card acceptance may differ from other potentially
wealth-transferring merchant expenditures. The following subsections assess these claims, concluding that they fail to justify
condemning credit card rewards either because no real distinction
exists or because any distinction weighs more heavily in favor of
intervening in markets other than credit cards.
1. Distinguishing Credit Cards Based on the Entity Deciding
Whether to Allocate the Cost
Some commentators have argued that retailers usually
decide for themselves whether to pass a particular expense on to
all customers through a unitary price or only to those customers

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

72

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Vol. 25:1

benefiting from the expenditure. For example, if a retailer pays a
shipper to deliver goods to a customer, the retailer decides
whether to allocate a separate charge for shipping or to provide
free shipping, which blends the cost into its general prices. A
common practice is to provide free shipping on more profitable
larger orders, but to allocate shipping separately for less
profitable small orders. To the extent that high-income
households place a disproportionate number of large orders, this
practice transfers wealth toward high-income households.
Intervention is generally believed to be unjustified in these cases
because the merchant may exercise its business judgment to
operate its business as it chooses.
Credit cards are different, these commentators claim,
because the card systems prohibit retailers from passing on the
acceptance fee only to credit card users.128 A merchant, therefore,
cannot choose to surcharge higher priced credit cards, while
blending the cost of non-reward cards into its prices. As an initial
matter, it is far from obvious why a wealth transfer resulting
from choices made jointly by card systems and merchants, who
choose to accept the cards, should justify regulatory intervention
when a transfer resulting solely from the merchant’s choice does
not. Moreover, any difference based on the entity responsible for
the choice is overstated and, to the extent that it is valid, the
limits that card systems impose are justified by the unusual
economics governing credit card markets.
It is overstated, because although, the card systems
prohibit surcharging, they permit merchants to allocate extra
costs to credit card customers in other ways. Federal law
safeguards cash discounting, 129 and many stores offer discounts
for consumers who use that store’s own credit card. 130 Stores
might also offer separate, and fewer, check-out lines for credit
card customers or free delivery for those who pay in cash. To be
sure, these measures may be less effective and/or more costly than
surcharging credit card purchases would be. Nevertheless,
retailers have options that would enable them to place at least a
portion of their card acceptance costs on credit card users if doing
so would increase their profits. Most retailers, however, simply
choose not to use these available tools.
More importantly, to the extent that the credit card
128
129
130

Katz, supra note 39, at 47; Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 636.
15 U.S.C. § 1666f (2011).
Appendix at II.G. See BEST BUY, supra note 98.
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systems do limit the ability to pass costs on to card users, they
have a legitimate business justification for doing so. A card
system must provide a service to two distinct customer bases,
consumers and merchants. 131 In such a two-sided market,
efficient pricing generally requires fee setting that diverges from
marginal cost pricing for each customer set. 132 Just as a
newspaper charges advertisers above marginal cost prices so that
it can deliver papers to readers at a price below marginal cost,
card systems charge merchants higher fees to enable the system to
attract cardholders and stimulate card use. If merchants fully
allocated the cost of card acceptance to individual card users, the
card systems could become less efficient. These pricing
considerations, which are addressed more fully in the following
Part, make credit card acceptance fees different from most other
merchant expenditures in a way that justifies a prohibition on
surcharging.133
2. Credit Card Fees Would Be Easier to Allocate than Other
Amenities
Allocating some merchant-provided amenities to
particular customers would be costly. For example, a merchant
charging for parking might need to limit access to the lot and hire
an attendant. Allocating credit card costs to those customers who
131
In the Visa and MasterCard systems, the central system generally deals
only with banks issuing cards and signing merchants. In some instances, these
systems may deal with large merchants, but never with cardholders. Economic
analysis of card systems, however, has typically viewed the participating
banks as part of the overall system marking cards accessible to both consumers
and merchants.
132
Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 J. OF
INDUS. ECON. 103, 114 (2002) (“Unless the partial demand functions are
identical, using cost-based regulation to determine [the per transaction
interchange fee] will maximize system output only by chance.”); GuerinCalvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 384-85 (explaining that “[t]he network
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card-holders who use
them compel a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the
cost-causality principles that call for prices to be closely linked to the
underlying costs of providing direct benefits to either side of the market”);
Michael L. Katz, What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does
it Mean for Public Policy?: Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, 126
(Proceedings – Payment Systems Research Conferences, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Kansas
City,
2005)
available
at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/PSR/pscp/2005/katz.pdf.
133
See infra Part VII.B & C.
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use them would, by contrast, entail a relatively small incremental
cost after the initial investment. 134 Merchants, however, rarely
allocate the cost of amenities even where they could do so easily
(e.g., shopping carts or bags). Customer resistance to extra
charges, rather than administrative expense, likely explains the
failure to allocate to particular customers both the cost of
amenities and credit card acceptance fees.
3. Consumers Can Choose Whether to Use Most Amenities
One commentator has argued that credit card fees are
different from other merchant expenses because consumers can
choose whether to use virtually all merchant-provided amenities,
but those without a credit card cannot choose to use one. Nor can
the card-less avoid the wealth transfer by shopping elsewhere
because almost all retail outlets accept credit cards. 135
In many, perhaps most, cases, however, a consumer who
does not use a credit card could use one. Although the terms will
surely vary based on a cardholder’s credit risk, very few
consumers cannot obtain a credit card if they want one. 136 Most
consumers who do not use credit cards for particular transactions
choose not to use them for a host of reasons, including
philosophical objections, budget planning, avoiding interest,
masking a record of the purchase, and whim. In these cases,
credit card acceptance is no different from other merchantprovided amenities.
Some consumers, however, may have their choices limited
as a practical matter even if they could theoretically obtain a
credit card. A significant percentage of American consumers have
no banking relationship, and the poorest Americans and minority
groups comprise a large majority of this unbanked population. 137
For this group, a welfare transfer, if it exists, would be unfair, but
not unusual. As described above, low-income consumers suffer in
a host of ways vis-à-vis those with higher incomes, and non-card
users could help themselves more readily than those
disadvantaged by other merchant practices. Low-wealth fliers
Katz, supra note 39, at 47.
Levitin, supra note 52, at 34-35.
136
Id. at 14.
137
Id. at 36. Javier Silva & Rebecca Epstein, Costly Credit, DEMOS, (May
2005), (using data from 1992-2001 and showing that 82% of whites held credit
cards, but only 59% of blacks and 53% of Latinos) available at
http://www.aecf.org/.
134
135
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could not readily increase their use of air transportation
sufficiently to qualify for free flights through frequent flier
programs. And parking, the quintessential merchant-provided
amenity that is often blended into purchase prices, can only be
enjoyed by those with cars. The carless, like the card-less, come
disproportionately from low-income households, and obtaining
and maintaining a car is considerably more difficult than
obtaining and using a credit card.

VII. INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO WEALTH
TRANSFER
In addition to the concerns recognized above, the FRBB
authors’ proposed regulatory remedies would be at least as likely
to increase consumer harm as to alleviate it. Although an
omniscient social planner could set credit card merchant fees at
precisely the right level to maximize consumer welfare, the FRBB
authors recognize that, like leprechauns, planners with perfect
market knowledge are hard to find. They thus point out that if
regulators set merchant fees at the wrong level, they would do
more harm than good. 138
In an attempt to avoid this problem, the authors draw on
the standard presumption that “cost-based pricing” 139 is
preferable. The FRBB authors refer to cost when suggesting that
merchants could be empowered to surcharge credit card
purchases. An objective cost measure, however, could also, in
theory, reduce regulatory discretion while indirectly decreasing
the price that merchants pay for card acceptance. Because of the
two-sided nature of credit card markets, however, the FRBB
authors’ proposed responses could reduce consumer welfare by
distorting efficient card system pricing.
A.

Efficient Pricing in Credit Card Markets

In real world markets, pricing decisions are based on a
variety of factors including cost, value, and the impact of
competition. Standard economic theory generally presumes that
cost-based pricing is desirable. In two-sided markets, like credit
cards, however, one must focus on the entire system’s costs and
the relative elasticity of demand of the customers on each side of
138
139

FRBB, supra note 1, at 36.
Id. at 35.
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the market, rather than the costs of serving a particular customer.
In setting prices, card systems face two distinct customer
bases: cardholders and merchants. Within such a two-sided
market, prices are efficiently set at the level necessary to recover
the system’s marginal costs. But the efficient price for the
cardholder and the merchant, the two sides of the market, may
not equal the marginal cost of the services received by each of
them. On the contrary, two-sided market theory predicts that an
efficient system will charge prices returning more than the
marginal cost of service to the customer set that is less sensitive to
price, i.e. has lower demand elasticity, and prices below marginal
cost to the customers on the other side. Assuming that merchant
demand for card acceptance is less elastic than cardholder
demand, allowing card systems to set merchant fees above their
basic costs of providing acceptance services, and prohibiting
surcharges, may enable the systems to ensure an efficient pricing
structure in which merchants pay more than their marginal cost
of service and cardholders pay less. By contrast, empowering
merchants to place card acceptance costs on card users, or
capping through regulation credit card acceptance fees at some
measure of cost created by merchants, would be inefficient to the
extent that it failed to take proper account of the relative
elasticities of demand between card users and merchants with
respect to card use.
1. Understanding Two-sided Markets
In a two-sided market (as all payment system markets
are), the use of the product or service by consumers on each side
of the market makes the product or service more valuable to
those on the other. Common examples of markets functioning this
way include newspapers (readers and advertisers), dating services
(men and women), and optical disc technology suppliers (disc
pressers and player manufacturers). The more readers, men, and
disc pressers that use these products and services, the more
valuable they will be to advertisers, women, and player
manufacturers; and vice versa. 140
Although the connection between value and use across
For a detailed discussion of the economics of two-sided markets see
generally David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When
Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667; David S.
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 325 (2003).
140
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customer types in a two-sided network market is intuitively
obvious, the implication of this economic effect for efficient
pricing is more opaque. In a typical one-sided market, an efficient
price – one that will lead to an optimal consumption level – will
generally approximate the marginal cost of production plus the
profit necessary to attract investment to the industry.141 This
pricing model is efficient because it maximizes short-run output
consistently with the producer earning sufficient revenue to
continue providing the product or service.
In a two-sided market, the same principle applies, but
efficient pricing must take account of both total cost and the
relative elasticities of demand between the two customer sets. 142 If
the customers on each side of such a market (merchants and
cardholders in rewards credit card markets) were charged the
marginal cost of serving just their side of the market, they could
fail to internalize the impact of their decisions to the customer set
on the other side. 143 For example, a merchant would fail to
account for the benefits of reward card use to a customer who
would make the same purchase with or without a card.
Two-sided market economic theory predicts that if
demand elasticities diverge to any significant degree between the
customers on each side of the market, output under a pricing
scheme that covered marginal-cost separately on each side of the
market would be inefficiently low. To obtain an efficient output
level, a producer must charge the customer set that is more
sensitive to price less than marginal cost of serving that customer
(effectively enabling those consumers to internalize the benefits to
both sides of the market). 144
The classic example is the daily newspaper. 145 Readers
have many sources of news, including television, magazines, and
the internet. Reader demand for newspapers is thus likely to be
Katz, supra note 132, at 127.
Evans & Noel, supra note 140, at 681.
143
Katz, supra note 39, at 126-27; Wright, supra note 76, at 8; GuerinCalvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 384-85 (explaining that “[t]he network
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card-holders who use
them compel a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the
cost-causality principles that call for prices to be closely linked to the
underlying costs of providing direct benefits to either side of the market”).
144
Katz, supra note 39, at 127; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 39, at 566;
Wright, supra note 76, at 17.
145
See Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-sided Markets: The
Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 571,
577-79 (2006).
141
142
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quite elastic, leading them to turn away from the morning paper
if the subscription price were to approach the marginal cost of
producing and delivering it. By contrast, advertisers perceive
significant benefits in print advertising (so long as readership is
high), and are thus willing to pay substantially above the
newspapers’ marginal cost of printing and providing associated
services to the advertiser because of the value of exposure
through a high circulation paper. As a result, readers pay
significantly below marginal cost and advertisers pay
substantially more. 146 Competition between newspapers and
other media for advertising space still drives pricing, but not to
marginal cost plus normal profit for each customer set.
This pricing pattern efficiently optimizes newspaper
circulation, satisfying both the advertisers’ need for broad
exposure and the readers’ need for information. Assuming that
newspapers have little market power, both advertisers and
readers would be worse off if pricing were forced into line with
marginal cost on each side of the market. If advertising fees were
to drop and reader fees proportionally increased, prices would
move toward marginal cost on each side of the market. Because
reader demand is more elastic, however, readership would drop
more than advertising would increase, and advertising rates
would thus fall. As a result, the paper would (1) earn lower
overall revenue; (2) be less valuable to advertisers because
readership would fall; and (3) be less valuable to readers because
the paper would have less revenue for newsgathering.
2. Applying Two-sided Market Theory to Card Markets
To the extent that the elasticity of demand varies
significantly between merchants and cardholders, credit systems
resemble newspapers. Assuming that merchants, like print
advertisers, are willing to pay significantly above the marginal
cost of the credit card acceptance services provided directly to
merchants because of the value card acceptance creates, but
many cardholders, like newspaper readers, would be reluctant to
pay the marginal cost of providing credit cards and associated
services, 147 two-sided market theory predicts that efficient credit
card pricing would resemble the existing marketplace – a greater
share of the total costs of the payment system are placed on
146
147

Id. at 577.
Id. at 585-88.
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merchants. 148
To be sure, relative elasticities across customer groups are
difficult to measure. Long standing practice in credit card
markets, however, appears to confirm that cardholder demand is
considerably more elastic than merchant demand. 149 Since the
beginning, card systems have adopted cost allocation systems that
empower cardholders to use cards without taking account of costs
that arise as a result of their decision. Every existing credit card
system has done this by charging merchants more than the cost of
providing card acceptance services, and each system adopted that
pricing policy well before it had market power. 150 By uniformly
adopting a pricing policy in a competitive market that shifts
revenue from the merchant side to the cardholder side, the card
systems practice accords with what two-sided market theory
would predict. 151
The efficiency of this form of elasticity-based pricing
garners further support by the growth in both merchant
acceptance and card use over time. 152 If a pricing policy placing a
greater burden on the merchant side were inefficient, one would
expect to see merchants rejecting credit cards. But that has not
happened. The existing system of cost allocation appears to be
efficient, and forcing cardholders to cover costs now paid by
merchants would be likely to lead to an inefficient under-use of
cards.

Id. at 584; Schmalensee, supra note 132, at 115 (explaining that
“increasing total output . . . by subsidizing price cuts where demand elasticity
is high . . . increases the size of the pie for the system as a whole”).
149
In ATM and PIN debit card markets, by contrast, interchange fees
have in some cases flowed away from issuers and toward merchants.
150
Semeraro, supra note 19, at 988 (explaining that “[t]he direction of
interchange fee payments . . . appears to be consistent with an efficient and
competitive market”); see Katz, supra note 39, at 123 (virtually all debit card
systems also have interchange fees flowing from merchants to issuers).
151
See Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced
Sharing: An Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 57,
97-98 (2003) (discussing generally how practices undertaken by firms in
competitive markets are presumptively efficient).
152
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has famously explained that practices
increasing output over time are likely to be efficient. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
972, 979 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 30-34 (1984).
148
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B. Efficient Pricing With Realistic Market Assumptions
Even if card acceptance fees were inefficiently high,
reducing those fees through regulation or shifting those fees to
cardholders could make the situation worse. The FRBB authors
do not even claim to show that fees are at inefficient levels, and
their analysis does not provide any means of determining the
overall impact on consumer welfare.
Two-sided market economic theory, however, predicts
that shifting costs from one side of the market to the other – as
regulation or surcharging would – would leave the market less
efficient if demand elasticities differ between the two markets. If
card markets are reasonably competitive and thus presumptively
efficient, any regulatory intervention is likely to do more harm
than good. 153
To understand the anticompetitive effect, consider a chess
club that when charging a uniform dues level for all players has a
membership that is (1) disproportionately low-skill players and (2)
lower in number than the club could efficiently accommodate.
The club organizers therefore decide to offer free admission to
high-skilled players, while increasing the dues charged to lowskilled members of the club. This differential pricing (1) attracts
more high-skilled players, (2) makes the club more desirable for
low-skilled players who thus attend more often, and (3) increases
membership and utilization of club facilities. By attracting more
high-skilled players through differential pricing, the club
functions more efficiently and thus all of its members benefit. To
be sure, low-skilled players bear a greater percentage of the cost
of operating the club than high-skilled players. But the club
provides more value to them, i.e. the chance to play against and
Katz, supra note 39, at 17 (explaining that surcharging can undo the
effects of interchange fees). Alan Frankel has questioned this justification for
the no-surcharge rule, arguing that if merchants want to encourage additional
card use, they could easily do so themselves through point-of-sale discounts
and other incentives. Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 647. But
merchants face conflicting incentives. The benefits that they receive from
credit cards are often infra-marginal, such as an overall increase in spending
levels not directly tied to individual transaction purchase decisions. Merchants
benefit at the margin only when the cardholder would not make the purchase
without the card. If the customer would make the purchase in all events, a
merchant may experience a marginal benefit from the use of another means of
payment, but an infra-marginal loss if cardholders stopped carrying credit
cards altogether. See Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of Credit
Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1348-49, 1353 (2008).
153
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learn from higher-skilled players.
The chess club with differential pricing corresponds to the
existing credit card market in which merchants, like low-skilled
players in the example, pay a higher percentage of the costs of the
payment system than necessary to recover the marginal cost of
serving them. Using the FRBB authors’ terminology, the chess
club’s pricing policy would transfer wealth from low-skilled
players to high-skilled players. But by choosing to frequent the
club in greater numbers, the low-skilled players demonstrated
that they preferred the club with differential pricing to the less
expensive club with a single price. Merchants’ willingness to
accept credit cards in ever increasing numbers within the card
systems’ existing pricing models communicates the same message.
Regulation or surcharging in the card market would
disrupt this presumptively efficient pricing mechanism by
shifting some costs onto cardholders. A similar disruption might
occur in the chess club if the meeting organizers surcharged highskilled players by, for example, charging them more for
refreshments at club meetings, undoing the benefit of the
differential pricing. High-skilled players enticed to join the club
by no dues policy would soon realize that they were paying more
for refreshments. The meeting organizer, like a merchant
surcharging card transactions, negates the benefit of the no dues
policy. High-skilled players would quit and the club would thus
end up back where it started – with an inefficiently low number
of members all paying the same entry fee.
The competitively set merchant fees, combined with a nosurcharge rule preventing merchants from undermining the
efficiency-enhancing purpose of the card systems’ differential
pricing policies, is a presumptively efficient pricing mechanism.
Just as high-skilled chess players would quit the club if shortsighted meeting organizers surcharged their refreshments,
cardholders would reduce their use of cards if regulators forced
banks to increase fees to cardholders or if merchants passed on
acceptance fees through surcharging. And if card acceptance
costs ever did reach inefficiently high levels, merchants would
have options. They could stop accepting credit cards or particular
brands of cards; they could offer cash discounts; and they could
offer their own reward programs to entice consumers to use the
merchant’s preferred means of payment.

Semeraro Article (Do Not Delete)

82

11/29/2012 12:27 PM

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 25:1

C. Additional Concerns with Surcharging
Even putting aside the likelihood that regulation or
surcharging would undermine efficient differential card-system
pricing, surcharging would be unlikely to increase consumer
welfare. First, a surcharging scheme would impose substantial
costs on a merchant that may outweigh any card-acceptance fee
reduction. Programming systems and training employees to
implement such a scheme would be a costly endeavor with
uncertain potential returns. These costs would be borne by all of
the merchant’s customers.
Second, even if surcharging were costless and could be
implemented without stoking customer dissatisfaction, merchants
would be unlikely to use the tactic efficiently. If there were an
inefficient overcharge by the card system, a surcharge could
theoretically improve efficiency. But it would be virtually
impossible for a merchant to know how much of a surcharge
would be necessary to counteract the overcharge. Because
efficient pricing in two-sided markets reflects the relative
elasticities between the two customer bases – not the marginal
cost of providing service to the merchant – the merchant would
not have the information necessary to determine how much of the
card acceptance fee to shift to cardholders without undoing the
pro-competitive benefits of differential pricing.
Moreover, even if merchants could calculate the optimal
surcharge, they would likely charge more because they would not
internalize all of the cardholder’s benefits of using a credit card.
If credit cards cost more on a per transaction basis than other
means of payment, then a merchant would prefer that its
customers use credit cards only when they would not otherwise
make the purchase with a cheaper payment device. 154 In setting
the surcharge, then, a merchant would discount the value of card
use to the infra-marginal consumer who would make the
purchase with or without a card, but would legitimately prefer to
use the card. Legitimate reasons to use a card include the desire
not to carry cash and to retain sufficient funds on ones person or
in a checking account for emergencies for which a credit card
would not be an acceptable means of payment.
Ultimately, merchants would likely divide into roughly
154
Wright, supra note 76, at 8-9; see Katz, supra note 39, at 55
(“surcharges might fail to be set at efficient levels even if acquiring and issuing
were perfectly competitive”).
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two camps: The first group, merchants in reasonably competitive
markets, would likely find the costs of surcharging prohibitive. 155
The second group, merchants with substantial market power,
might surcharge, but these merchants could potentially retain a
significant portion of the card fee savings as profit rather than
pass it on to their customers. 156 These merchants may even use
the surcharging power to exact greater profits from those
consumers who must use a credit card for a particular
transaction. 157
A merchant with market power could thus do
considerable competitive damage, and there is reason to believe
that at least some merchants would exploit the opportunity. The
possibility that most merchants would have the ability and
incentive to wield a surcharging scalpel precise enough to cut out
the bad, while preserving the good, is remote.

VIII. APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO NEGATIVE
CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECTS FROM REWARD
CREDIT CARD USE
The FRBB authors recognize that their proposals would
reduce the welfare of consumers currently collecting credit card
rewards. But they believe that this loss would be outweighed by
the gains of other consumers. Their analysis, however, does not
confirm that their proposals would, on balance, help consumers.
As this paper has shown, the predicted wealth transfer may not
exist at all. If that is true, then credit card rewards serve a
155
See Zhu Wang, Market Structure and Credit Card Pricing: What
Drives Interchange?, 28 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 86, 95 (2010) (concluding that
the no-surcharge rule “does not play a role” with respect to merchants in
competitive markets).
156
Julian Wright, Optimal Card Payment Systems 8 (Social Science
Research Network, National University of Singapore, Working Paper, 2002)
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278047
(explaining that “[w]hen surcharging is allowed, merchants with monopoly
power will exploit their power by setting a price to extract surplus from
inframarginal cardholders”).
157
See Gans & King; supra note 102, at 25 (explaining that the no
surcharge rule “can play an important, socially desirable, role in eliminating
the ability of merchants to use the choice of payment instrument as a means of
practicing price discrimination . . . [that] serves to distort the cost of
transacting further away from its cost minimizing level”); Wang, supra note
155, explaining that no-surcharge rule can be welfare enhancing where it limits
surcharging by merchants with market power); Wright, supra note 156, at 8.
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valuable function in stimulating card use that effectively benefits
all consumers. Encouraging merchants to surcharge could undo
that benefit. Second, even if there is a wealth transfer, capping
fees, as the FRBB authors admit, may itself undermine consumer
welfare goals. And permitting surcharging may have little impact
and could cause problems of its own. Merchants in competitive
industries may avoid surcharging, just as they have refused to
implement cash discounting schemes, because of the costs and
likely customer backlash. Merchants with market power, by
contrast, would likely surcharge. But these merchants may push
the surcharge beyond the level of any cross-subsidy and retain the
excess as profit rather than lowering their prices. Low income
and unbanked individuals might be worse off in such a regime.
If regulatory intervention is deemed necessary, a more
fruitful approach would be to foster banking relationships among
those who currently do not have them. This strategy would have
two prongs. First, informational programs could educate the
unbanked about the availability and safety of banking services,
including credit cards.
Second, regulators could provide
incentives to financial institutions to reach out to the currently
unbanked.
Those who are currently outside the system may benefit
far more from banking services, including credit cards of their
own, than from potentially efficiency-defeating regulation
designed to eliminate a cross subsidy that may not exist. Credit
cards have very low or even negative costs to cardholders who do
not run balances. The means of payment used today by those
with no banking relationship, principally cash and money orders,
impose significant costs that extend well beyond cross subsidies.
The risk of uninsured loss through theft or otherwise is
significant. In addition, while many checking accounts now
impose no or minimal fees for depositing or writing a check,
check cashing outlets, and those that sell money orders, impose
substantial fees. And, of course, using these services is time
consuming. Lastly, when the need to purchase on credit arises, an
unbanked consumer is generally limited to expensive “payday”
loans; the rigors of the pawn shop; or worse. Access to a credit
card for unbanked individuals could reduce or eliminate these
costs as well as any cross-subsidy.

CONCLUSION
It is quite difficult to make the case that regulatory
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intervention could right a social wrong inflicted on those who do
not use credit cards. One cannot conclusively demonstrate that
card use reduces consumer welfare, and even if it did, the
potential cures would likely be worse than the disease. That
regulators have not intervened in the many markets that display
potential wealth transfer effects supports this view. And given
the economics of two-sided markets governing payment system
pricing, capping merchant fees or permitting surcharging would
likely lead to inefficiencies that increase prices and decrease
welfare. By contrast, legislation designed to extend the benefits of
credit cards to those households not currently using them
regularly would likely provide more certain and valuable
benefits.

